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I. AN INTRODUCTION TO THE ISSUES
A. The Setting
1. Judicial
The pendulum has swung back once again. The "misappropriation
theory"' indeed lives. Prosecutors are now both encouraged and enabled to pursue
1. A government-created method of extending liability for insider trading under
§ 10(b) and Rule lOb-5, articulated most precisely by former Chief Justice Warren Burger,
while dissenting in, Chiarella v. U.S., 445 U.S. 222 (1980), which the government lost:
I would read § 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 to encompass and build
on this principle: to mean that a person who 'has misappropriated
nonpublic information has an absolute duty to disclose that information
or to refrain from trading.
The language of § 10(b) and of Rule lOb-5 plainly supports
such a reading. By their terms, these provisions reach any person
engaged in any fraudulent scheme. This broad language negates the
suggestion that congressional concern was limited to trading by
"corporate insiders" or to deceptive practices related to "corporate
information." Just as surely Congress cannot have intended one standard
of fair dealing for "white collar" insiders and another for the "blue
collar" level. The very language of § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 by repeated
use of the word 'any' [was] obviously meant to be inclusive.
Id. at 240 (emphasis in original).
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insider trading on this rationale using § 10(b) and its Rule 10b-5 under the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934.2
This recent major victory for securities regulators comes directly from a
somewhat unique and far-reaching new coalition on the Supreme Court led by
Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg (appointed by President Clinton), the author of the
groundbreaking new opinion, wh6 was joined by five other justices in the recent
decision of United States v. O'Hagan.
3
Without much surprise to experienced court watchers, Justices Breyer (a
President Clinton appointee), Souter (appointed by President Bush), and Stevens
(appointed by President Carter), sided with the majority. Predictably, Chief Justice
Rehnquist (appointed by President Nixon), Justice Scalia (appointed by President
Reagan), and Justice Thomas (appointed by President Bush) agreed in a scathing
dissent.4
The big news to many lawyers and academics5 was the alignment with the
majority of the two other appointees of President Reagan, Justices O'Connor and
Kennedy. Previous opinions written by each of them6 seemed to have indicated a
reluctance to accept the misappropriation theory and, indeed, a hesitation to extend
§ 10(b) as a prosecutorial weapon at all.
With this new majority, the way is paved for a more aggressive criminal
pursuit of "inside" traders by the SEC. At the same time, there are major questions
left unresolved and critical reasons to significantly restrict the use of this theory in
private civil causes of action. Regrettably, judicial activism with a vague statute
and recent federal legislation encouraging individual plaintiffs appear to be
directing us the opposite direction.
2. Legislative
After years of relative dormancy, the right of an individual investor or
would-be purchaser or seller of shares, not in possession of material, nonpublic
information, to sue an alleged insider or tippee has recently resurfaced. In 1988,
Congress adopted § 20(A) of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, allowing a
2. See United States v. O'Hagan, 117 S. Ct. 2199, 2206 (1997).
3. Id.
4. Id. at 2220-31.
5. For early prognostications, see, for example, Wade M. Hall, Insider Trading
Liability: Are We Ready to Leave the Misappropriation Theory Quagmire?, 44 U. KAN. L,
REy. 867 (1996); Audrey Strauss & Lisa Fishbone, Insider Trading After Chestman, 793
PLI/Coi'. 365, 374 (1992), available in WL, PLI/Corp. Library; Thomas Lee Hazen,
United States v. Chestman-Trading Securities on the Basis of Nonpublic Information in
Advance of a Tender Offer, 57 BROoK. L. REv. 595, 597 (1991); Steven R. Salbu, The
Misappropriation Theory of Insider Trading: A Legal, Economic, and Ethical Analysis, 15
HARV. J.L. & PuB. POL'Y 223 (1990).
6. Central Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. 164,
173-78 (1994) (Kennedy, J.); Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 256-57 (1988)
(O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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private civil suit by a "contemporaneous trader" against an individual defendant
who made his trade based on material nonpublic information.7
Then just three years ago, Congress passed the Private Securities
Litigation Reform Act of 1995' ("Reform Act") to guide the conduct of private
lawsuits that allege violations of the anti-fraud provisions of the 1933 and 1934
Acts,9 such lawsuits being the major method for compensating defrauded
investors. On November 4, 1998, President Clinton signed into law S.1260, known
as the Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998, which was recently
passed by both houses of Congress to further limit securities class actions in state
court.10
The list of possible abuses of such private litigation has long been cited
by the members of the United States Supreme Court, including the uncertain
identity of plaintiffs, the ability of stock market speculators to seek the protection
of this law, the scope and calculation of highly conjectural damages, problems of
proof as to whether a trade actually would have ever occurred and the likelihood of
enormous numbers of federal lawsuits surfeiting our already crowded courts.
Of equal importance, little mention has been made of whether Congress
should actually be in the business of protecting speculators or even passive
investors (so-called Joe Six-Packs) who essentially gamble on the continuation of
lofty returns by well-marketed mutual funds without any interest in, or knowledge
of, the individual corporate stock components or management of their funds'
portfolio. It is now estimated that twelve percent of all daily trades over the
NASDAQ are made by so-called "day-traders," individuals who make hundreds of
transactions in dozens of stocks each day.12 "What we try to teach people is that in
day trading, stocks aren't stocks. They are four-letter symbols for making
money."
13
7. The Insider Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act of 1988
("ITSFEA") 15 U.S.C. § 78t-1 (1994). Essentially a successor to the "Insider Trading
Sanction Act of 1984," Congress noted upon ITSFEA's adoption that ITSFEA's private
right of action, created under the newly promulgated § 20(A) is specifically intended to
overturn court cases which have precluded recovery for plaintiffs where the defendants'
violation is premised upon the misappropriation theory. See Hall, supra note 5, at 883.
However, no language to that effect was included in the final statutory section.
8. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4 (Supp. 1996).
9. Id.
10. Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-353,
112 Stat. 3227 (to ammend 15 U.S.C. §§ 77p, 78bb).
11. Chiarella v. United States, 444 U.S. 222, 231 (1980) (Justice Powell noting
that in the absence of a clearly-defined group to whom the defendant owes a duty, plaintiff
identification is uncertain); Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 734-35
(1975) (Justice Rehnquist addressing the problems of uncertain damages and hypothetical
trades, and concluding that a widely-expanded class of plaintiffs will result in more
litigation).
12. James B. Kelleher, Got To Be Quick, SAN DIO UNION TPm., Apr. 14, 1998,
at Cl.
13. Id. (quoting Dan Mirkin).
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However, the O'Hagan decision, together with the adoption of both
§ 20(A) and the Reform Act, create a serious concern that Congress and the courts
could now be in the business of protecting hypothetical transactions-a most
dangerous game.
14
After a brief summary of these issues and their origins, this Article will
explore the history of the 1934 Act, its well-known Rule 10b-5 and judicial
interpretations leading up to O'Hagan. The Article then focuses on the dangers
and weaknesses of the now viable misappropriation theory when applied to
individual civil causes of action, concluding with both legislative and judicial
recommendations for its future use.
B. Brief Capsule
1. The First Wave
From a macro perspective, the O'Hagan decision is merely the latest
swing of the Supreme Court from one pole to the other concerning this
controversial New Deal legislation.'5
It should be noted initially that Rule lOb-5 6 is not a congressional
enactment, but rather an SEC promulgation under § 10(b). Created in 1948, the
Rule was used for the first couple of decades by the lower federal district and
circuit courts to facilitate pro-prosecutorial efforts against insider trading. Opinions
were filled with aggressive judicial activism, expanding the scope of the legislation
beyond what many believed was the original congressional intent.'
Contrariwise, in the early years of Rule 10b and § 10(b)(5) litigation, the
United States Supreme Court regularly denied certiorari and allowed the Second
Circuit Court of Appeals, particularly, to be the "Mother Court" in this field.' s
Historically, the legislative intent of § 10(b) is quite perplexing when it is
compared to its sister provisions, §§ 16(a) and (b), adopted at the same time. This
latter 1934 Act, commonly called the "short swing profits" statute, was written by
the identical Congress in a completely different and more comprehensive style
allowing relative ease of interpretation and application.
14. By comparison, the Securities Act of 1933 is not intended to tell any
individual whether or not to buy or sell a stock. It essentially demands full disclosure of all
material information. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (1994).
15. Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975); Ernst & Ernst
v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976); Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462 (1977).
These opinions, authored by Justices Rehnquist, Powell, and White, respectively, restricted
the availability of Rule lob-5 as a prosecutorial weapon.
16. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1998).
17. Congressional inaction was perhaps best summarized by the Supreme Court
itself when it said "[t]hat task, [interpreting § 10b] it would appear, Congress has left to us."
Musick Peela & Garrett v. Employers Ins. of Wausau, 508 U.S. 286, 294 (1993).
18. See Blue Chip Stamps, 421 U.S. at 762; United States v. Re, 336 F.2d 306
(2d Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 904 (1964).
19. 15 U.S.C. § 78p (1994).
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Without such congressional guidance for § 10(b), however, the expansive
"judicial legislation" focus of Rule lOb-5 reached its zenith in 1968, with the
landmark Second Circuit conviction in Securities and Exchange Commission v.
Texas Gulf Sulphur Co.,2 from which certiorari again was denied.2
2. Initial Flow Away
Starting in the niid-1970s and continuing for almost a decade thereafter,
the Supreme Court became active and swung the pendulum in the opposite
direction. In a series of opinions written by then Justice Rehnquist, Justice White,
and particularly Justice Powell (who authored three of them), the court restricted
the expansion of § 10(b) significantly.' As a result of these decisions, prosecution
of insider trading declined, and the future of the Rule as a useful legal tool seemed
limited.
Ironically, it was during this time, that Chief Justice Burger, in a
dissenting opinion in the 1980 case of Chiarella v. United States, 3 urged the court
to adopt a theory that when a person has "misappropriated" material nonpublic
information that is entrusted to him in the utmost confidence and then essentially
exploits that ill-gotten informational advantage by purchasing securities in the
market, he should be found to have violated § 10(b) and Rule lOb-5.24 However,
due to faulty jury instructions, the full court refused to deal with that issue in
Chiarella, leaving everyone unclear on this rationale until United States v.
O'Hagan.'5
3. The Stalemate
During the late 1980s, the personal philosophy of jurists again intervened
in the higher courts that reviewed insider trading litigation. The Justices of the
United States Supreme Court and the judges of the Second Circuit Court of
Appeals were almost evenly split on the application of the Rule.
To illustrate, in 1987 Justice Kennedy had not yet been sworn in before
the well-publicized appeal of the insider trading case of front page Wall Street
Journal writer, R. Foster Winans, convicted in the lower court on the
misappropriation theory in Carpenter v. United States.26 As a result, the Supreme
Court split four to four in what should have been the definitive treatment of this
rationale. Since "an affirmance by an evenly divided Court [is not] entitled to
precedential weight,"'2 the Court's view of the theory still was unclear. How
20. 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied,.
21. 404 U.S. 1005 (1971).
22. Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646 (1983) (Powell, J.); Chiarella v. United States,
445 U.S. 222 (1980) (Powell, J.); Santa Fe Industries Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462 (1977)
(White, J.); Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 185 (1976) (Powell, J.)Blue Chip
Stamps, 421 U.S. at 723 (Rehnquist, J.).
23. See Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 239.
24. Id at 245.
25. 117 S. Ct. 2199, 2206 (1997).
26. 484 U.S. 19 (1987).
27. Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, 192 (1972).
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Justice Kennedy would have voted is officially unknown, but in his subsequent
majority opinion in Central Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver,28
he led the court in again rejecting an extension of Rule lOb-5.
One year after Carpenter, Justice Blackmun, the great dissenter in the
1970s' insider trading cases that restricted § 10(b), finally was able to write a
prevailing opinion in Basic Inc. v. Levinson.29 However, he could only assemble a
four to two plurality, with Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia and
Kennedy not participating." While that decision upheld a lower court conviction,
the division of the Supreme Court was apparent. Significantly, Justice O'Connor
joined Justice White in a strong dissent urging Congress to be the source for
expanding § 10(b) rationale, not the court.
Finally, in 1991, while attempting to resolve this Rule lOb-5 issue, the
2nd Circuit Court of Appeals assembled its entire court in a major
misappropriation case, United States v. Chestman.3 However, one judge retired
after hearing the case, and the remaining eleven split, five to five with one other
separate opinion. Together with Basic Inc. v. Levinson's32 four to two plurality,
and the Carpenter v. United States33 four to four "nonprecedential" split, these
three cases demonstrated a virtual judicial deadlock in this area.
4. The Movement Back
United States v. O'Hagan' begins the fourth wave of insider trading
cases. With Justices O'Connor and Kennedy shifting gears and joining the
majority, the stage seems set for a new decade of pro-prosecutorial criminal
rulings. How far the court will, and should, go in private civil cases is the major
question reviewed in this Article.
Due to illness and long years of service, Justices Rehnquist and O'Connor
have indicated that they may retire in the next couple of years.35 If so, one major
publication has already indicted that Justice Ginsburg is considered to be the likely
replacement as Chief Justice.36 Likewise, if a Democrat is elected president in the
year 2000, then court appointments over the next several years should create a
broader swing and continue the O'Hagan trend of expanding § 10(b) by an even
larger majority.
28. 511 U.S. 164, 173-78 (1994).
29. 485 U.S. 224 (1988). See Santa Fe Indus. Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462 (1977);
Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976); Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drugs, 421
U.S. 723 (1975).
30. As a matter of historic policy, the Court does not reveal the reasons why
justices do not participate in decisions.
31. 947 F.2d 551 (2d Cir. 1991), cert. denied, Chestman v. U.S., 503 U.S. 1004
(1992).
32. 485 U.S. 224 (1988).
33. 484 U.S. 19 (1987).
34. 117 S. Ct. 2199, 2206 (1997).
35. Jeffrey Rosen, The New Look of Liberalism of the Court, NY TIMES MAG.,
Oct. 5, 1997, at 61.
36. Id. at 62.
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One might well inquire whether the political philosophy of the Justices is
the best method for resolving such major economic issues affecting millions of
people. Admittedly, Congress has been of little help beyond its vague language in
§ 10(b) written over sixty years ago. Could it now be expected to play a larger role
and provide guidance?
What are the dangers of this new wave, from both a doctrinal and political
perspective? How can steps be taken to bring predictability and continuity to the
field and who should do so? An analysis of these questions and a call for dual
action are the thrust of the balance of this Article.
II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF SECURITIES LAWS APPLICABLE
TO INSIDER TRADING
A. The Beginning
At common law, the definition, issuance, purchase, and sale of securities
were all regulated solely by the states. 7 As a general rule, a "director" or
"officer"38 of a corporation whose stock was publicly traded on a market was not
required to disclose any inside, material information concerning his corporation
before trading on that material information, even if that trade was based solely on
such facts.3 9 As a result, undisclosed good news led to significant profits on
purchases, and inside knowledge of portending bad news led to short sales and
similar gains by the trader.'
Federal remedies seemed the only blanket answer. Motivated by the stock
market crash of 1929 and the election of President Roosevelt three years later,
Congress finally enacted a "Securities Act of 1933," ("1933 Act"), 4' which,
peculiarly, was to be administered by the Federal Trade Commission. This Act was
directed primarily at the initial distribution of newly issued securities.
The theory behind the 1933 Act is that investors need to be adequately
protected by a "full and fair disclosure" of all material information which a
prospective purchaser would want to know before bringing a new issue.' The
37. In 1911, the Kansas legislature adopted the first law in the nation governing
securities transactions, and all 50 states have them now.
38. See, e.g., Barbara A. Ash, State Regulation of Insider Trading-A Timely
Resurgence?, 49 OHiO ST. L.J. 393, 399 (1988).
39. Smith v. Hurd, 985 F.2d 574 (9th Cir. 1993) (unpublished table decision,
available at 1993 WL 28366); Blabon v. Hay, 169 N.E. 268 (Mass. 1929).
40. Even today, in most jurisdictions, state courts have been reluctant to expand
insider trader liability, specifically rejecting such Supreme Court rationales as "fraud on the
marketplace," "presumptions of reliance and materiality," and when someone needs to
disclose what may be "material information." Diamond v. Oreamuno, 248 N.E.2d 910 (N.Y.
1969); Mirkin v. Wasserman, 858 P.2d 568 (Cal. 1993); Linder Fund, Inc. v. Waldbaum,
624 N.E.2d 160 (N.Y. 1993).
41. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (1994).
42. See, e.g., Noelle Matteson, Comment, Private Securities Litigation Reform
Act of 1995: Do Issuers Still Get Soaked in the Safe Harbor?, 27 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REv.
527-28 (1997).
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1933 Act now includes a number of private remedies for investors.4 3 There are
general anti-fraud provisions preventing material omissions and misrepresentations
in connection with the sale of securities; however, the scope of the 1933 Act is
narrow, dealing only with distributions of securities and protecting just purchasers.
The more significant statute applying to trading is the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, ("1934 Act")." This omnibus bill was so broad that
Congress created the Securities and Exchange Commission to administer the
statute, relieving the FTC from its short lived administrative responsibilities in the
securities field.
B. Contrast Between the Two Key Initial Sections of the 1934 Act
A startling comparison arises immediately between the two primary
portions of the statute dealing with stock trades, § 10(b) and §§ 16(a) and (b). Both
reveal much with regard to the scope and intent of Congress at the time.
1. Section 10(b)
Section 10(b) was designed to prohibit "manipulative" and "deceptive"
devices employed in connection with the purchase or sale of any "security."45 In
relevant part, it provides simply that,
[I]t shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the
use of any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the
mails, or of any facility of any national securities exchange... (b) to
use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any
security registered on a national securities exchange or any security
not so registered, any manipulative or deceptive device or
contrivance in contravention of such rules and regulations as the
Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public
interest or for the protection of investors.46
That was the extent of the language. Legislative history provided little guidance
regarding the intent of Congress, thus giving the Securities Exchange Commission
a greater authority, depending upon its philosophy, to use § 10(b) as a weapon to
deal with allegedly manipulative or fraudulent securities conduct.
2. Section 16
A comparison between § 10(b) and §§ 16(a) and (b), the so-called "short
swing" profit statute, shows dramatic differences in statutory intent.
Unlike § 10(b), § 16 does the following: it (a) defines who is covered
(directors, officers, and ten percent shareholders); (b) requires the security to be
traded on a "national securities exchange"; (c) forces such persons to file
registration statements annually after any trades; (d) requires any party to
43. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (1994 & Supp. 1996).
44. 15 U.S.C. § 78a (1994).
45. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1994).
46. Id.
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"disgorge" any "profit" realized from any purchase and sale or sale and purchase
within any period of less than six months; (e) applies, with certain exceptions,
"irrespective of intention"; (f) identifies the plaintiffs; and (g) creates a statute of
limitations. 4'
Contrariwise, with the vague § 10b, it took nine years after that statute
was passed for the SEC, in 1943, to adopt Rule lOb-5,48 which states in pertinent
part:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use
of any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the
mails or of any facility of any national securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to
omit to state a material fact necessary in order to make the
statements made, in the light of the circumstances under which they
were made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business
which operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any
person, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.49
47. 15 U.S.C. § 78p (1994).
48. 17 C.F.R. § 240, lOb-5 (1997).
49. A marvelous anecdote has been written about the origin of this Rule by
Milton Freeman, who created it. Speaking in 1967 at a conference on the codification of the
Federal Securities Laws, with Sumner Pike and the recently deceased Louis Loss on the
panel, he said:
I think it would be appropriate for me now to make a brief
statement of what actually happened when lOb-5 was adopted, where it
would be written down and be available to everybody, not just the people
who are willing to listen to me.
It was one day in the year 1943, I believe. I was sitting in my
office in the S.E.C. building in Philadelphia and I received a call from
Jim Treanor who was then the Director of the Trading and Exchange
Division. He said, "I have just been on the telephone with Paul Rowen,"
who was then the S.E.C. Regional Administrator in Boston, "and he has
told me about the president of some company in Boston who is going
around buying up the stock of his company from his own shareholders at
$4.00 a share, and he has been telling them that the company is doing
very badly, whereas, in fact, the earnings are going to be quadrupled and
will be $2.00 a share for the coming year. Is there anything we can do
about it?" So he came upstairs and I called in my secretary and I looked
at Section 10(b) and I looked at Section 17, and I put them together, and
the only discussion we had there was where "in connection with the
purchase or sale" should be, and we decided it should be at the end.
We called the Commission and we got on the calendar, and I
don't remember whether we got there that morning or after lunch. We
passed a piece of paper around to all the commissioners. All the
commissioners read the rule and they tossed it on the table, indicating
approval. Nobody said anything except Sumner Pike who said, "Well,"
he said, "we are against fraud, aren't we?" That is how it happened.
1148 ARIZONA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 40:1137
Even though it has been characterized as an anti-fraud provision, Rule 10b-5 has
been used to bar insider trading without ever speaking of those terms. The
legislative history gives some indication that insider trading is one of the evils the
section was intended to address, but there is little evidence of what types of insider
trading would be considered manipulative or deceptive within the meaning of the
section.
Thus, the SEC and the courts were left with the task of defining the scope
and characteristics of liability for insider trading. Commenting on the judicial
expansion of this field thirty years after its adoption, Chief Justice Rehnquist
described the Rule as "a judicial oak which has grown from little more than a
legislative acorn."5
C. Weapons for the Twenty-First Century
1. The Insider Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act of 1988( ITSFEA ")51
Section 20(A)52 establishes a private cause of action against a defender
trading on the basis of material, nonpublic information, by anyone who happens to
,.contemporaneously" trade on the other side of the market as the defendant:
Any person who violates any provision of this chapter or the rules or
regulations thereunder by purchasing or selling a security while in
possession of material, nonpublic information shall be liable in an
action in any court of competent jurisdiction to any person who,
contemporaneously with the purchase or sale of securities that is the
subject of such violation, has purchased (where such violation is
based on a sale of securities) or sold (where such violation is based
on a purchase of securities) securities of the same class.5 3
It also creates a five-year statute of limitations following the date of the
last violative transaction 54 and liability for those "controlling" the liable trader.55
Before adoption of this Section, the courts were split as to the efficacy of such
claims. However, even today serious questions remain about its definitions,
particularly the word "contemporaneous"56 and the validity of suing based upon
transactions which might have occurred.
Louis is absolutely right that I never thought that twenty-odd
years later it would be the biggest thing that had ever happened. It was
intended to give the Commission power to deal with this problem. It had
no relation in the Commission's contemplation to private proceedings.
Milton Freeman, Administrative Procedures, 22 Bus. LAW. 793, 922 (1967).
50. Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723,737 (1975).
51. 15 U.S.C. § 78 t-1 (1994). Note the rather bizarre numbering system of the
1934 Act. There are two Section 20 "alphas": § 20(A) and § 20(a).
52. 15 U.S.C. § 78t-l(a) (1994).
53. Id.
54. 15 U.S.C. § 78t-l(b)(4) (1994).
55. 15 U.S.C. § 78t-l(b)(3) (1994).
56. Congress did not create a new definition of the word "contemporaneous," but
1998] PRIVATE SECURITIES LITIGATION REFORM 1149
That is, could an individual plaintiff (so-called "Joe Six-Pack") charge
that had he known of the information motivating the defendant's illegal trade, he
would have (or have not) bought (or sold) depending upon the movement of the
stock price? If so, how does Joe prove damages? Such questions as what quantity
of shares would he have bought or sold-and at what precise moment during the
trading market's day of operation, need to be answered carefully in order to
establish price and calculate damages. Of course, the actual market price would not
be accurate either, because the volume of the defendant's illegal trades influenced
that price. Should those trades thus be voided or excluded and the entire trading
pattern of the day(s) in question recalculated? The enormity of these problems and
their speculative calculations will be explored in this paper.
Confusingly, the other § 20 alpha is 20(a),' 7 which establishes
"controlling person" liability, presumably in favor of those who already have won
their civil suit against the controlled person. Thus, it is distinctly possible for Joe
Six-Pack to not only sue Mr. O'Hagan but, thereafter, his law firm."
Finally, the use of class actions encouraged under the Reform Act,59 also
opens up enormous opportunities for those who never had any dealings with, or
even knew of, the defendants; a serious question discussed below.'
To complete the overlapping and confusing numbering system, § 21(A)61
allows the SEC to bring a civil action against the violator for an antitrust-like
treble damages penalty. It also may sue the "controlling person" of the trading
used its meaning as evolved from case law, albeit ambiguous. See, e.g., Wilson v. Comtech
Telecomm. Corp., 648 F.2d 88 (2d Cir. 1981); Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch, Inc., 495 F.2d 228
(2d Cir. 1974). These cases determined that "contemporaneous" means "at the same time as
the insider or for some period thereafter, and that a reasonable period of liability could be as
short as a few days but no longer than a month." In re Verifone Secs. Litig., 784 F. Supp.
1471, 1489 (N.D. Cal. 1992).
57. This section states:
Every person who, directly or indirectly, controls any person liable under
any provision of this title or of any rule or regulation thereunder shall
also be liable jointly and severally with and to the same extent as such
controlled person to any person to whom such controlled person is liable,
unless the controlling person acted in good faith and did not directly or
indirectly induce the act or acts constituting the violation or cause of
action.
15 U.S.C. § 78t(a) (1994).
58. This section 20(a) imposes both joint and several liability on persons who
control another who is liable for violations of the securities laws, but the plaintiff has to
establish (a) a primary violation of some section of those laws, and (b) that the defendant
actually exercised control over the party engaging in the unlawful conduct. See, e.g., Simon
v. American Power Conversion Corp., 945 F. Supp. 416 (D.R.I. 1996).
59. The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub L. No. 104-67,
109 Stat. 737 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C. (Supi. 1996)).
60. See supra notes 56-58. The primary focus of the Reform Act is on class
actions as distinct from individual suits. Such class actions always have been strongly
favored in securities fraud suits. See, e.g., In re Cenco, Inc. Sec. Litig., 519 F. Supp. 322
(N.D. Ill. 1981); Moscarelli v. Stamm, 288 F. Supp. 453 (E.D.N.Y. 1968).
61. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-1 (1994).
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defender, which could well include a law partnership or CPA firm. Moreover, the
1934 Act now gives the SEC the extraordinary weapon to pay a "bounty" to
informants:62
Thus, statutory as well as judicial weapons have been created which could
well lead to an enormous increase in civil litigation. Essential congressional
definitions and guidance, however, remain missing, vague, or uncertain.
2. The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 and the Securities
Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998
Passed by a heavily Republican Senate over President Clinton's veto, the
1995 Reform Act 63 was intended to greatly impact federal private lawsuits for
securities fraud, whether by way of class action or individually. While such suits
frequently provide the only practical way to compensate defrauded small investors,
defense counsel, of course, believe that these are the very type of claims most
prone to abuse. Class actions invariably require expensive and time-consuming
discovery, virtual origination and control by plaintiffs' lawyers, and a potential for
exorbitant attorneys' fees and judgments.
When passing the Reform Act, Congress attempted to curb these potential
abuses by adopting the following principal rules to be applied to federal securities
cases: (1) a "safe harbor" period for forward-looking statements by the issues
about its prospective performance;" (2) a stay of discovery while the inevitable
motion to dismiss is being decided; 65 (3) tougher pleading standards requiring a
specific recital of facts showing a "strong inference" of fraud;66 (4) a "lead
62. (e) Authority to award bounties to informants
Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection (d)(1) of this
section, there shall be paid from amounts imposed as a penalty under this
section and recovered by the Commission or the Attorney General, such
sums, not to exceed 10 percent of such amounts, as the Commission
deems appropriate, to the person or persons who provide information
leading to the imposition of such penalty. Any determinations under this
subsection, including whether, to whom, or in what amount to make
payments, shall be in the sole discretion of the Commission, except that
no such payment shall be made to any member, officer, or employee of
any appropriate regulatory agency, the Department of Justice, or a self-
regulatory organization. Any such determination shall be final and not
subject to judicial review.
15 U.S.C. § 78u-l(e) (1994).
63. Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737, codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4 (Supp.
1996).
64. No appellate cases have yet been decided on this subsection, but early lower
court filings under this particular theory have been extremely rare.
65. Defense counsel almost universally files such a motion. See Martin, Juneja,
Foster & Dunbar, Recent Trends IV, What Explains Filings and Settlements in Shareholder
Class Actions, N.E.R.A., Nov. 1996; Rodd Zolkes, No Filings in Securities Suits Field, Bus.
INSURMACE, Dec. 16, 1996, at 3.
66. The Section states:
(1) Misleading statements and ommissions.
In any private action rising under this chapter in which the
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plaintiff' provision designed both to take control of class action litigation away
from the lawyers and to encourage institutional shareholders to sue;67 and (5) a
system of proportionate, non joint and several, liability of defendants who are not
found to have knowingly committed fraud; that is, those who had no scienter. 68
plaintiff alleges that the defendant-
(A) made an untrue statement of a material fact; or
(B) omitted to state a material fact necessary in order to make
the statements made, in the light of the circumstances in which they were
made, not misleading;
the complaint shall specify each statement alleged to have been
misleading, the reason or reasons why the statement is misleading, and,
if an allegation regarding the statement or omission is made on
information and belief, the complaint shall state with particularity all
facts on which that belief is formed.
(2) Required state of mind.
In any private action arising under this title in which the
plaintiff may recover money damages only on proof that the defendant
acted with a particular state of mind, the complaint shall, with respect to
each act or omission alleged to violate this chapter, state with
particularity facts giving rise to a strong inference that the defendant
acted with the required state of mind.
(3) Motions to dismiss; stay of discovery.
(A) Dismissed for failure to meet pleading requirements
In any private action arising under this chapter, the court shall,
on the motion of any defendant, dismiss the complaint if the
requirements of paragraphs (1) and (2) are not met.
15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b) (Supp. 1996). A major split exists in the federal courts as to whether
the law merely adopted the Second Circuit's tough pleading criteria from In re Time-
Warner, Inc. Securities Litigation, 9 F.3d 259 (2d Cir. 1993), or a stricter one requiring
conscious acts, not mere recklessness. In re Silicon Graphics, Inc. Sec. Litig., 970 F. Supp.
746 (N.D. Cal. 1997); Friedberg v. Discreet Logic, Inc., 959 F. Supp. 42 (D.C. Mass. 1997).
67. The person selected as the class representative must be one who has been
injured and did not sell or purchase securities in order just to become part of the class
action. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(a)(2)(A)(ii) (Supp. 1996). The selected representative is also not
allowed to accept any payment beyond his pro rata share in the action for being the class
representative. Id. § 78u-4(a)(2)(A)(iv). Once a complaint is filed, "within 20 days the
plaintiffs must publish, in a widely circulated, national, business oriented publication or
wire service, a notice advising members of the purported plaintiff class, the claims asserted,
the class period, and that any member of the class can move to become lead plaintiff." A
lead plaintiff will be chosen by the court within ninety days of the publishing of the notice.
Id. § 78u-4(a)(3)(A). This provision is intended to raise the quality and presumably case
merits of plaintiffs, but early cases have shown that it has little likelihood of doing so. See
Joseph A. Grundfest & Michael A. Perino, Securities Litigation Reform: The First Year's
Experience (A Statistical and Legal Analysis of Securities Fraud Litigation Under the
Private Securities Litigation Reform Act), John M. Olin Program in Law and Economics
Working Paper Series, Stanford Law School, Working Paper No. 140, Feb. 1997
(manuscript on file with author).
68. Most practitioners consider this section to have a built-in effect of lowering
damage awards from the former "out of pocket" test of what would have been the stock
price without the fraud, to an average of actual prices subsequent to the fraud which,
logically, would be influenced by other factors than the fraud itself.
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a. Some Early Readings on the Reform Act
If a goal of Congress under the Reform Act was to encourage institutional
investors to pay for and participate in such litigation, it seems to have failed, at
least in its early years of existence. For numerous reasons, including cost, exposure
to discovery, and public relations, large brokerage institutions rarely join as
plaintiffs.
In prior years, plaintiffs' counsel raced to the courthouse for the specific
purpose of being the first to file and thus control the suit (some pre-Reform Act
cases had been filed as early as the day of the initial offering). Early cases filed
under the new Reform Act have shown that plaintiffs are still hurrying to file.
However, their goal now is to be the first to send out on the Internet the mandated
"notice to others"69 to join the case. This congressionally mandated marketing and
extensive advertising by law firms of their proclaimed merits in order to remain as
lead counsel will do nothing but increase litigation-the opposite of Congress'
goal. 70
b. The 1998 Act
In the short period since the adoption of the Reform Act, state court class
actions actually increased in number. Defense counsel argued in the early cases
that the increase was attributable to plaintiffs' lawyers' efforts to avoid the Reform
Act's provisions, particularly the tighter pleading requirements and discovery stay,
which do not apply in state court. Plaintiffs allegedly engaged in wide, early
discovery in the state court case with the intent to later use that evidence in the
federal case-a clever backdoor circumvention of the Reform Act. Others pointed
to the various pro-plaintiff advantages available in different jurisdictions, such as
prior decisions accepting causes of action for aiding-and-abetting, the opportunity
for nonunanimous jury verdicts and the right to seek punitive damages as reasons
for the increase in litigation.
The Supreme Court's decision in Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. v.
Epstein,7 also influenced this area. That case held that a state court judgment
dismissing a state class action suit pursuant to a settlement agreement also could
include a provision barring federal securities fraud class actions arising out of the
same transaction, even if the state court initially lacked jurisdiction to adjudicate
the federal claims.72 This ruling gave state courts control over a complete, global
settlement of all such claims-an ironic twist. Perhaps most startling is that the
California Supreme Court recently granted a hearing in a case seeking to submit
both federal and state securities claims to California State Blue Sky laws-an
extraordinary possibility.73
69. § 78u-4(a)(3)(A)(i) (Supp. 1996).
70. § 78u-4(a)(3)(B)(iii)(l)(bb) (Supp. 1996).
71. 516 U.S. 367 (1996).
72. See Securities Exchange Act § 27, 15 U.S.C. § 78aa (1994) (establishing
exclusive federal jurisdiction of Exchange Act claims).
73. Pass v. Diamond Multimedia Sup. Inc., Case No. C V-75 8927 (Santa Clara
Cty. Sup. Ct. 1997).
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These early post-Reform Act consequences prompted new federal
legislation. Signed into law in November 199874 by President Clinton, the new
Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998 appears to be a major step
restricting the ability of investors to file class action shareholder lawuits in state
courts against corporations whose stock trades on major national exchanges.
Having vetoed the broader Reform Act, which is the only congressional
enactment passed over President Clinton's veto during his six years in office, the
President signed this bill, which appears at first glance to be more pro-executive.
The Reform Act raises the bar over which shareholders must pass when they bring
lawsuits attacking corporate earnings predictions and forecasts that prove
erroneous.
In the findings leading toward the bill, Congress made the following
statements:
The Congress finds that-
(1) the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 sought to
prevent abuses in private securities fraud lawsuits;
(2) since enactment of that legislation, considerable evidence has
been presented to Congress that a number of securities class action
lawsuits have shifted from Federal to State courts;
(3) this shift has prevented the Act from fully achieving its
objectives;
(4) State securities regulation is of continuing importance, together
with Federal Regulation of securities, to protect investors and
promote strong financial markets; and
(5) in order to prevent certain State private securities class action
lawsuits alleging fraud from being used to frustrate the objectives of
the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, it is
appropriate to enact national standards for securities class action
lawsuits involving nationally traded securities, while preserving the
appropriate enforcement powers of State securities regulators and
not changing the current treatment of individual lawsuits.
75
This new bill amends both the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities
and Exchange Act of 1934 to prohibit private class actions based upon a state
statute or common law in either State or Federal court, by any party alleging (1) an
untrue statement or omission in connection with the purchase or sale of a covered
security, or (2) that the defendant used any manipulative or deceptive device in
connection with such a transaction.76 It also declares that any class action brought
in any state court involving a covered security shall be removable to the federal
district court for the district in which the action is pending.77 While there are some
74. Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-353,
112 Stat. 3227 (to ammend 15 U.S.C. §§ 77p, 78bb).
75. Id. § 2 (to amend 15 U.S.C. § 78a).
76. Id. § 101(a)(1)(b)(1), (2) (ammending 15 U.S.C. § 77p).
77. Id. § 101(a)(1)(c) (ammending 15 U.S.C. § 77p).
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exemptions still allowing class suits in somewhat limited circumstances, 78 the bill
is a major step toward preempting state jurisdiction and will be a unique challenge
to plaintiff's counsel seeking to enforce their client's rights.
c. The Tighter Pleading Objective
It is universally conceded that the Reform Act, at a minimum, adopted the
Second Circuit's rule that a complaint must plead specific facts giving rise to a
strong inference of the defendant's fraudulent intent. Whether the Reform Act
went farther is much debated.
78. See id. §101(a)(1)(d) (ammending 15 U.S.C. §77p).
(d) PRESERVATION OF CERTAIN ACTIONS.-
(1) ACTIONS UNDER STATE LAW OF
INCORPORATION.-
(A) ACTIONS PRESERVED.-Notwithstanding subsection
(b) or (c), a covered class action described in paragraph (B) of this
paragraph that is based upon the statutory or common law of the State in
which the issuer is incorporated (in the case of a corporation) or
organized (in the case of any other entity) may be maintained in a State
or Federal court by a private party
(B) PERMISSIBLE ACTIONS.-A covered class action is
described in this subparagraph if it involves-
(i) the purchase or sale of securities by the issuer or an affiliate
of the issuer exclusively from or to holders of equity securities of the
issuer; or
(ii) any recommendation, position, or other communication
with respect to the sale of securities of the issuer that-
(I) is made by or on behalf of the issuer or an
affiliate of the issuer to holders of equity securities of the issuer; and
(II) concerns decisions of those equity holders with
respect to voting their securities, acting in response to a tender or
exchange offer, or exercising dissenters' or appraisal rights.
(2) STATE ACTIONS.-
(A) IN GENERAL.-Notwithstanding any other provision of
this section, nothing in this section may be construed to preclude a State
or political subdivision thereof or a State pension plan from bringing an
action involving a covered security on its own behalf, or as a member of
a class comprised solely of other States, political subdivisions, or State
pension plans similarly situated.(B) STATE PENSION PLAN DEFINED.-For purposes of
this paragraph, the term "State pension plan" means a pension plan
established and maintained for its employees by the government of the
State or political subdivision thereof, or by any agency or instrumentality
thereof.
(e) PRESERVATION OF STATE JURISDICTION.-The securities
commission (or any agency or office performing like functions) of any
State shall retain jurisdiction under the laws of such State to investigate
and bring enforcement actions.
Id. §101(a)(1)(d) (ammending 15 U.S.C. §77p).
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In In re Time Warner Inc. Securities Litigation,79 the Second Circuit held
that a strong inference of scienter could be established: (1) by "alleg[ing] facts
establishing a motive to commit fraud and an opportunity to do so" or (2) by
"alleg[ing] facts constituting circumstantial evidence of either reckless or
conscious behavior."8 The Reform Act's pleading standard language only
provides that a complaint must "state with particularity, facts giving rise to a
strong inference that the defendant acted with the required state of mind."'"
However, a uniform pleading standard has not materialized. 2
The Conference Report of the Managers preparing the Reform Act, in the
text accompanying footnote twenty-three, states unequivocally that "because [it]
intends to strengthen existing pleading requirements, it does not intend to codify
the Second Circuit's case law regarding pleading."83 During the reargument in
Congress, this footnote was cited as a major reason for President Clinton's veto of
the bill by its sponsors, Senators Dodd and Domenci, who both said that the
Reform Act did adopt the Second Circuit's pleading test.84 Clearly the United
States Supreme Court needs to clarify this area soon.
d. What Degree of Intent Is Required Now?
Another key issue remaining is whether allegations of "recklessness" or
"motive and opportunity" are sufficient to satisfy the Reform Act's "strong
inference" pleading standard, long a debated concept. Most courts that have
considered the issue have held that (a) the Reform Act did not change the
substantive law regarding the scienter required to establish liability under Section
10(b) and Rule lOb-5 and, therefore, recklessness suffices to plead scienter; and
(b) the Reform Act's pleading standard should be applied in a manner consistent
with Second Circuit case law.85 Therefore, allegations of motive and opportunity
79. 9 F.3d 259 (2d Cir. 1993).
80. Id. at 268. The definition of recklessness has long been debated and
interpreted variously by federal courts although the SEC uses the term as defined in
Sundstrand Corp. v. Sun Chemical Corp., 553 F.2d 1033 (7th Cir. 1977).
81. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(2) (Supp. 1996).
82. No one argues that a standard less than the Second Circuit's was adopted.
The question is how much tougher will the courts make those requirements?
83. H.R. CoNE. REP. No. 104-369, at 41 (1995).
Regarded as the most stringent pleading standard, the Second
Circuit requirement is that the plaintiff state facts with particularity, and
that these facts, in turn, must give rise to a "strong inference" of the
defendant's fraudulent intent. Because the Conference Committee
intends to strengthen existing pleading requirements, it does not intend to
codify the Second Circuit's case law interpreting this pleading standard.
Id.
In a footnote, the Conference Committee stated: "For this reason, the Conference
Report chose not to include in the pleading standard certain language relating to motive,
opportunity, or recklessness." Id. at 48 n.23.
84. 141 CONG. REc. S17960, (Dec. 5, 1995).
85. In the Senate debates preceding passage of the Conference bill, its co-
authors, Senators Dodd and Domenici, clearly argued that the Committee had adopted the
Second Circuit's pleading standard. Senator Dodd stated:
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may be sufficient to plead a "strong inference" of scienter. 6
More particularly, in In re Baesa Securities Litigation,7 the Southern
District of New York recently held that the Reform Act did not "disturb the
substantive law of what is the required mental state for a securities fraud
violation"'88 and rejected the contention that recklessness was not sufficient to
satisfy the scienter requirement. The court went farther, holding that allegations of
motive and opportunity may be sufficient to give rise to the strong inference of
scienter required by the Reform Act. 9
Likewise, in In re Health Management, Inc. Securities Litigation," the
Eastern District of New York held that recklessness and motive and opportunity
are sufficient to plead a strong inference of scienter under the Reform Act, because
the standard to be imposed by the [Reform Act] was to be one of
'knowing misbehavior", Congress knew well how to state that
standard. The Court finds the omission of such language in the
statute significant in concluding that the Second Circuit's pleading
standard was not abrogated by the [Act]. 9'
[I]nstead of trying to take each case that came under the
second circuit, we are trying to get to the point where we would have
well-pleaded complaints. We are using the standards in the second
circuit in that regard, then letting the courts-as these matters will-test.
They can then refer to specific cases, the second circuit, [or] otherwise,
to detdrmine if these standards are based on facts and circumstances in a
particular case. That is what we are trying to do here.
141 CONG. REc. S17960 (Dec. 5, 1995).
86. Zeid v. Kimberley, 973 F. Supp. 910, 914 (N.D. Cal. 1997) ("[The failure to
provide an alternative interpretation militates against completely dispensing with the
Second Circuit's well-developed two-part inquiry." Id. at 917); Rehm v. Eagle Fin. Corp.,
954 F. Supp. 1246, 1252 (N.D. Ili. 1997) ("[W]e find that § 78u-4(b)(2) adopts the Second
Circuit standard."); Marksman Partners, L.P. v. Chanta Pharm. Corp., 927 F. Supp. 1297,
1311 (C.D. Cal. 1996) (a review of the complete text of the legislative history "makes clear,
there is no basis to conclude that Congress eradicated, sub silentio, the well-established
'motive and opportunity' test for examining scienter...").
87. 969 F.Supp. 238 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).
88. Id. at 242.
89. The court noted:
The first question raised by the pending motions to dismiss
these consolidated class actions is whether the Private Securities
Litigation Reform Act of 1995.. .(the "Reform Act") heightens the
scienter requirement for liability in a private securities fraud action by
requiring more than "recklessness." The answer is no. The second
question is whether the Reform Act makes the pleading of "motive and
opportunity" no longer automatically sufficient in this Circuit to raise the
"strong inference" of fraudulent scienter. The answer is yes. The final
question is whether plaintiffs should be given leave to re-plead to
attempt to rectify this shortcoming. The answer is no.
Id. at 239.
90. 970 F. Supp. 192 (E.D.N.Y. 1997).
91. Id. at 201 (citation omitted).
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Contrariwise, In re Silicon Graphics, Inc. Securities Litigation,' and
Friedberg v. Discreet Logic Inc.,9 have looked at the statute's long legislative
history and held that allegations of recklessness or motive and opportunity are no
longer sufficient. There the courts stated that not only is the pleading standard
higher under the Reform Act than the Second Circuit's test, but also that scienter
needs conscious acts, not mere recklessness. 94
Thus, the door has been opened for conflicting and uncertain judicial
interpretations of the same types of difficult and ambiguous issues found in § 10b
cases. These concerns which have long troubled so many federal courts as well as
the U.S. Supreme Court will continue-clearly an unacceptable prospect.95
III. JuDIcIAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LEGISLATION: THE FIRST
WAVE
There were four major cases dealing with Rule lOb-5 in the first quarter
century after its adoption in 1943.
A. Kardon v. National Gypsum Co.
In Kardon,96 a Pennsylvania District Court judicially created an implied
cause of action under the Rule, although none had been urged by the SEC nor had
Congress so provided in the underlying statute.' This decision, like many others in
the early years, found culpability for insider trading only when there was a breach
of a fiduciary relationship.98
92. 970 F. Supp. 746 (N.D. Cal. 1997). The case has been split for purposes of
appeal to the Ninth Circuit into Janas v. McCracken, Docket # 97-16204, and Brody v.
McCracken, Docket # 97-16240. Oral argument in both cases was held on June 11, 1998,
and the appeals are pending.
93. 959 F. Supp. 42,49 (D. Mass. 1997) (appeal filed).
94. Silicon Graphics, 970 F. Supp. at 757; Friedberg, 959 F. Supp. at 49-50.
95. Whether the Act raises the quality and integrity of plaintiffs and their cases
may never be proven. Certain jurisdictions, particularly the Northern District of California
(encompassing Silicon Valley) and the Southern District of New York (encompassing Wall
Street), major judicial players in this field, have been virtually unanimous in granting early
motions to dismiss under the Act, most without leave to replead. Perhaps as a result, such
cases are being filed in numerous, and previously unused, federal district courts and state
courts around the country. It thus seems doubtful that any clear read of the Reform Act's
success or failure is at least a few years away.
96. 73 F. Supp. 798 (E.D. Penn. 1947).
97. On that most fundamental issue, Justices Scalia, Rehnquist, Thomas, and
White (until his retirement in 1993) have made strong comments in their Rule lob-5
opinions that if they were hearing the "implied private cause of action" matter ab initio,
they would not have created one. Judge Friendly in the landmark Texas Gulf Sulphur case
made the same observation. SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 865 n.1 (2d Cir.
1968) (Friendly, concurring).
98. The directors of a corporation were found liable for trading on inside
information when they purchased stock from existing shareholders without disclosing to
them that they had already negotiated the sale of the controlling block of company stock to
others at a greater price than what they were paying the plaintiffs. The court held that the
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The court concluded that "the existence of a [private] remedy is implicit
under general principles of the law."' In essence, individual officers and directors
trading on material insider information do not have to work for a registered
corporation or one that is publicly traded to be guilty of violating 10b-5, and the
corporation could be even a small, intrastate close entity, so long as it had at least
some interstate commerce contact.I°°
B. Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Corp.
In 1952, the Second Circuit decided Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Corp.,'
0 1
which materially restricted the scope of § 10(b). It held that an individual plaintiff
had to be a purchaser or seller of the issuer's security to be in violation of
§ 10(b). 2 Potential purchasers or sellers who claimed that they would have traded
had they known of inside information were no longer allowed to sue, nor could
actual shareholders who claimed that they would have traded had they known this
information before hand. Moreover, the court stated that mere corporate
mismanagement which drives a stock price down does not give rise to a § 10(b)
case. Rather, any claim for such conduct belongs in the state courts.'1 3
The Birnbaum decision, like Kardon and other early insider trading cases,
reflects an effort on the part of the court to stay within the narrow confines of
Congress's initial concerns under the 1934 Act: proceeding against directors and
other insiders abusing their positions of trust and confidence." ° These two
opinions sat somewhat idly for almost a decade until the SEC's philosophy
developed that in addition to directors, officers, and controlling shareholders,
others such as family, friends, and non-officer employees, were in positions to
exploit material inside information not available to the investing public.
defendants had breached their fiduciary duty and committed fraud under the 1934 Act for
failing to disclose this material information before trading. Kardon, F. Supp. at 801.
99. Id. at 802.
100. These days with computerized trading, it seems doubtful that there would be
any trouble finding interstate commerce in virtually any trade other than an absolute one-on-
one, private, non-public market purchase and sale of shares of a closely-held corporation in
a single jurisdiction.
101. 193 F.2d 461 (2d Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 956 (1952).
102. Id. at 463.
103. Id. at 464.
104. See supra notes 96-100 and accompanying text.
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C. In the Matter of Cady, Roberts & Co.
Nine years later in In the Matter of Cady, Roberts, & Co., 105 the SEC
issued a landmark ruling0 6 concluding that an investment banker and a broker
working for his firm to whom he "tipped" material, nonpublic information, should
both be treated as insiders in violation of Rule 10b-5.1' In coming to this
conclusion, the SEC created two categories of insiders: "traditional" and
"nontraditional."'0 8 Traditional insiders were typically identified as directors,
officers, or controlling shareholders who had always been considered such under
common law. However, the SEC extended Rule 10b-5's duty to "disclose inside
information or abstain from trading," to all persons who enjoy "a relationship
giving access, directly or indirectly, to information intended to be available only
for a corporate purpose."'" A further prong to this extension of § 10(b) that is to
be considered is, "the inherent unfairness involved where a party takes advantage
of such information knowing it is unavailable to those whom he is dealing."
'
"10
This has become known as the "disclose or abstain" rule. Anyone in
possession of material inside information has to either disclose it to the investing
public or if he chooses not to do so, abstain from trading. The SEC was extending
liability not just to one who buys and sells stock based on inside information but
even to an insider who merely "tips" someone else yet does not trade himself."'
A closer analysis of Cady, Roberts reveals that it was both the initial
government prosecution of insider trading and the first case in which § 10(b) was
interpreted by the SEC to ban all securities trading based on misuse of inside
corporate information, including market transactions consummated through an
independent securities market."' The broker was held to derive insider liability
through a tip from an insider without there being any pre-existing personal
relationship of trust to serve as the basis of fraud.
Commission Chairman William Cary used these words, which were
repeated in part in numerous subsequent U.S. Supreme Court decisions"' to
describe the obligation to "disclose or abstain" from trading as consisting of
105. 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961). David Cowdin, both an investment banker with Cady,
Roberts & Co., and a director of Curtiss-Wright Corp., attended a board meeting of the
latter company. There he learned of a decision to reduce the corporation's dividend. Cowdin
then left the board room and called a Cady, Roberts partner to inform him of the newly
acquired information before it was publicly released. Based upon this information, the firm
immediately sold Curtiss-Wright stock in all of its customers' accounts. Furthermore, it sold
borrowed stock at the current market price in anticipation of a price decline after public
disclosure of the dividend cut, at which point it purchased an equivalent number of shares to
cover. In other words, the firm sold "short."
106. Id. at 910.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. See Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646 (1983) (Powell, J.); Chiarella v. U.S., 445
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two principle elements; first, the existence of a relationship giving
access, directly or indirectly, to information intended to be available
only for a corporate purpose and not for the personal benefit of
anyone, and second, the inherent unfairness involved where a party
takes advantage of such information knowing it is unavailable to
those with whom he is dealing.
1 14
Cady, Roberts gave the courts a starting point to evolve § 10(b) on the
new rationale that it gave the outsider-investor a more level playing field in the
stock market. Its assumption, of course, was that outsiders are innocent parties
whom the law should be expected to protect. Events in the next few decades
explored this question more carefully and offered quite a different answer. For the
time being, however, the "test" of who was an insider and who was not would
continually expand and confuse.
D. SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co.
In 1968, the Second Circuit established the starting point in the modern
evolution of insider trading laws." s This was the first appellate case to go beyond
the common law and into the realm of § 10(b). It essentially expanded the SEC's
administrative decision in Cady, Roberts."6 The court held officers, employees,
and tippees liable for insider trading under Rule 10b-5.1 7 The ruling in Texas Gulf
Sulphur went beyond the SEC's finding in Cady, Roberts by holding that anyone
who traded on the information violated Rule 10b-5." 8
U.S. 222 (1980) (Powell, J); Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462 (1977) (White, J.);
Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976) (Powell, J.);Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor
Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975) (Rehnquist, J.).
114. In re Cady, Roberts & Co. 40 S.E.C. 907, 912 (1961).
115. 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968). The facts were quite dramatic. Texas Gulf
Sulphur Co. employees detected a promising mineral deposit on company land in Ontario,
Canada. It drilled an initial test hole which turned up extraordinarily promising results.
Further analysis determined that the sample contained an extremely high level of valuable
mineral content. Mitchell v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 446 F.2d 90, 94 (10th Cir. 1971). The
Company itself was held liable to selling shareholders for its mismanagement of the press
release. At this point, drilling was suspended while the company sought to purchase
surrounding land, arguably a legitimate business concern. One of the adjacent landowners
sued the firm under contract law for wrongful use of its information when buying his land.
The case was settled. See M. SHULMA, "THE BILLION DOLLAR WINDFALL, Ch. 7 (1969).
During this period of drilling suspension, corporate officers, having knowledge of
this discovery, made extensive purchases of Texas Gulf Sulphur stock in the open market,
before any public disclosure of the discovery was made. Moreover, several corporate
individuals (some were key officers; others, remote employees with officer titles) also
bought stock. In 1991 with no guidance from Congress, the SEC itself finally defined an
"officer" for Section 16(b) purposes, as including only the issuing company's president,
principal financial and accounting officers, any vice president in charge of a principal part
of the issuers operation and any other "policy makers." 56 FED. REG. 7242 (1991) (codified
at 17 C.F.R. § 240.16a-1 (1993)).
116. Cady, Roberts, 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961).
117. Id.
118. Texas Gulf Sulphur, 401 F.2d at 848.
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The court reiterated the Cady, Roberts test that "anyone in possession of
material inside information must either disclose it to the investing public, or,
if...he chooses not do to so, [he] must abstain from trading in or recommending
the securities concerned while such insider information remains undisclosed," but
the prohibition on trading on nonpublic information within Rule lOb-5 applied to
"anyone in possession" (including non-insiders) of material nonpublic information.
As a result, the court no longer limited insider trading liability to situations
involving breach of a fiduciary duty." 9
In addition, the Second Circuit.. .set forth its test of materiality of
non-public information indicating that it would depend upon 'a
balancing of both the indicated probability that the event will occur
and the anticipated magnitude of the event' and how a 'reasonable'
man would attach importance to the information in determining his
choice of action.
120
Then, in a major effort to define the objectives of Rule lOb-5, which
Congress had not done, the court shifted from the mere prevention of insider
misconduct to the promotion of "equal access" to information by all potential
traders in a so-called ideal, "efficient market."
The court stated:
By [the 1934] Act Congress purposed to prevent
inequitable and unfair practices and to insure fairness in securities
transactions generally, whether conducted face-to-face, over the
counter or on exchanges....
The Rule is based in policy on the justifiable expectation
of the securities marketplace that all investors trading on impersonal
exchanges have relatively equal access to material information....
The essence of the Rule is that anyone who, trading for his own
account in the securities of a corporation has "access, directly or
indirectly, to information intended to be available only for the
corporate purpose and not for the personal benefit of anyone" may
not take "advantage of such information knowing it is unavailable to
those with whom he is dealing."'
2
'
Again, the assumption was that individual potential plaintiffs were
innocent victims of an unequal stock market. The court expanded this theory,
implying that merely trading based on material nonpublic information may itself
defraud the market. This established a rebuttable presumption of "reliance" on the
part of the plaintiff, and eliminated the need for privity or a relationship between
119. Id.
120. James H. Cheek, III, The Ever Developing Law of Insider Trading, C903
ALI-ABA 439, 442 (Feb. 24, 1994) (quoting from Texas Gulf Sulphur). See also Lisa J.
Finnell, Comment, United States v. Carpenter: Second Circuit Overextends the
Misappropriation Theory of Criminal Liability Under Rule 10b-5, 12 DEL. J. CORP. L. 605,
606 (1987).
121. Texas Gulf Sulphur, 401 F.2d 848 (quoting Cady, Roberts, 40 S.E.C. 907,
912 (1961)).
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the buying shareholder and the defendant seller. Causation, likewise, could not be
found under this general fraud theory.' 22
Further, the court measured the damage by calculating how long it would
take a reasonable investor to trade after becoming aware of the information.'2 3 The
court also tried to give some help as to when insiders could trade by saying that
they should wait "until the news could reasonably [be] expected to appear over the
media of widest circulation, the Dow Jones broad tape," certainly an archaic
concept today.124
Judge Friendly, in a concurring footnote, said that were he considering
the question of the existence of an "implied private cause of action" ab initio, he
would not have favored it himself, raising the same question which several
Supreme Court Justices would address similarly in later cases."z
Over the next several years the SEC relied heavily on Cady, Roberts and
Texas Gulf Sulphur to proceed more vigorously in prosecuting nontraditional
insiders who were trading on nonpublic information. However, the U.S. Supreme
Court did not deal with the statute in any meaningful way and continued to deny
certiorari, thus perpetuating uncertainty in the field.
IV. THE 1970s-THE PENDULUM SWINGS BACK
Suddenly in the mid-1970s the Supreme Court quickly decided a series of
opinions restricting Rule 10b-5. The composition of the court had changed with
several appointments by President Nixon. Then Justice Rehnquist joined together
with Justice White (a Kennedy appointee) and Justice Powell (a Nixon appointee),
in putting the brakes on any expansion of this rule. The battle lines had been drawn
between conservatives and liberals once again-particularly Justices Powell and
Blackmun, both Nixon appointees, yet diametrically opposed on this issue.
A. Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores
In 1975, the Court in Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores,126
essentially confirmed Birnbaum v. Newport Steel, 7 holding that a plaintiff under
Rule lOb-5 must be a purchaser or a seller and that corporate mismanagement is
not a lOb-5 violation. The majority opinion, written by Justice Rehnquist, reasoned
that to rule otherwise would open the courts to literally tens of thousands of
speculators who could argue that they would have bought or sold had they only
122. Id. at 848-49.
123. Id. at 851-52.
124. Texas Gulf Sulphur, 401 F.2d at 854.
125. Id. at 865 n.1 (Friendly, concurring). See Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646 (1983)
(Powell, J.); Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222 (1980) (Powell, J.); Santa Fe Indus.,
Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462 (1977) (White, J.); Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185
(1976) (Powell, .); Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975)
(Rehnquist, J.).
126. 421 U.S. at 747-49.
127. 193 F.2d 461,463-64 (2d Cir. 1952).
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known of the information."2 Moreover, the calculations of damages would be
virtually impossible. This opinion was almost a direct refutation of Texas Gulf
Sulphur.
Justice Powell not only concurred with the decision but argued that the
Court should have gone further to say that lOb-5 should not even be applied to
insider trading. He urged that § 16(b) (the six-month automatic violation rule by
officers, directors, and ten percent shareholders) should be the sole statute
applying to cover this field. 29
Contrariwise, in a strong dissent, Justice Blackmun, together with Justices
Marshall and Brennan, argued that Birnbaum should be overruled. Their view was
that even a nontrading plaintiff should be able to recover if he can show that he
would have bought or sold had he known the material information which
influenced the defendant's action.'30
B. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder
One year later in 1976, in Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder,'3 Justice Powell
wrote a majority opinion that limited liability under Rule lOb-5. He held that a
CPA firm, which allegedly wrote a negligent report which the plaintiffs claimed
induced them not to buy stock, could not be held to "aid and abet a violation."
Instead, he said, "scienter was needed: an intent to defraud, manipulate or deceive
the market."' Justice Blackmun again wrote a vigorous dissent, arguing that the
negligent creation of misleading corporate documents is enough for liability.
3 3
C. Santa Fe Industries v. Green
Then in Santa Fe Industries v. Green, Justice White and the Court again
reversed a Second Circuit decision which upheld 10b-5 liability, and, rejected the
SEC's amicus curiae brief for that doctrine's extension, by holding that "mere
unfairness" is not enough for a lOb-5 violation."M
"Deception is required in order to violate that section," concluded the
Court. The case involved a "reverse merger" by a ninety-five percent shareholder
taking over the five percent minority under a Delaware statute allowing such
action. The Court held that state courts were the ones to enforce such claims-not
the federal courts under lOb-5.
35
While not misappropriation theory cases, these three decisions revealed a
strong predisposition by certain justices about the nondesirability of judicial
expansion of this vague congressional statute and SEC created rule. Each case
128. Id. at 749-50.
129. See Blue Chip Stamps, 421 U.S. at 756.
130. Id. at 764-66.
131. 425 U.S. 185, 187, 193 (1976).
132. Id. at 210-12.
133. Id. at 216-17.
134. Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462,464,477 (1977).
135. Id. at 477-78.
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urged Congress to act, and in each decision the majority opinion justices spoke of
the regrettable earlier judicial creation of an implied private cause of action, with
which they reluctantly had to live.'36
V. EARLY MISAPPROPRIATION CASES-THE OPPORTUNITY FOR A
QUICK KNOCKOUT
Reeling from these three so-called "anti-10b-5" Supreme Court decisions,
the SEC started to evolve a new doctrine, primarily based upon "stealing" and
trading upon material, nonpublic information. The Second Circuit was ready to
listen.
A. United States v. Chiarella
In one of the most celebrated insider trading cases, United States v.
Chiarella,37 the Second Circuit again applied its theory of equal access to the
market from Texas Gulf Sulphur, in upholding the conviction of a financial
printing company's line employee who traded based upon nonpublic information
which he gained in the course of his employment. 3 '
Chiarella's main argument on appeal of his District Court conviction
under Rule 1Ob-5 was that he was not a corporate insider of the companies targeted
for takeover and, therefore, he had no fiduciary duty to disclose or abstain from
trading.'39
Although Chiarella's information did not come from insiders, the Second
Circuit said that this was not necessary to find liability. 4 ' Instead the court focused
on what it termed the "unfair advantage" obtained when information that has not
yet been made public is used in trading. In holding that Chiarella's activity
constituted a violation of Rule lOb-5, the court stated, "[a]nyone corporate insider
or not who regularly receives material nonpublic information may not use that
information to trade in securities without incurring an affirmative duty to
disclose."''
136. See id.; Ernst & Ernst, 425 U.S. at 196; Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug
Stores, 421 U.S. 723,729-30 (1975).
137. 588 F.2d 1358, 1365-66 (2d Cir. 1978).
138. Chiarella, 588 F.2d at 1363-64. Vincent Chiarella was a printer who worked
as a "markup man" in a New York financial printing firm. Among the confidential
documents that he handled were announcements of corporate takeover bids. The names of
the corporations were either left blank or disguised using false names. Chiarella, however,
was able to figure out which corporations were involved. Without disclosing this
knowledge, he purchased stock in the target corporations. Furthermore, he immediately sold
his shares after the takeover bids were made public.
139. Id. at 1364.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 1365.
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B. The Supreme Court's Incomplete Response: Chiarella v. United States142
The stage was thus set for Justice Powell and the Court to confront this
new misappropriation theory. The general feeling at the SEC and among corporate
practitioners in this field was that the Chiarella case would be the ultimate
decision on the doctrine. Unfortunately, this would be the first of many
disappointments with Supreme Court decisions in this area in the late 1980s. 4"
Under its new theory, the SEC argued that criminal liability under § 10(b)
should be extended to persons who trade on information in violation of a duty to
their employers, and thus, to the corporations retaining their employers, even
though they have not violated a duty to the persons with whom they trade.
Essentially, no privity existed with those on the opposite side of Chiarella's trades
in an anonymous market.
The majority opinion, written by Justice Powell, (four years after he
wrote Ernst & Ernst) again reversed the Second Circuit over a scathing dissent by
Justice Blackmun.'" While the Court stated that Chiarella was not guilty of
violating Rule lOb-5 because "a duty to disclose under § 10(b) does not arise
[with] the mere possession of nonpublic market information," 14 the primary focus
of the decision was on the jury instructions given by the lower, convicting court.
These instructions failed to instruct "on the nature or elements of a duty.. .to
anyone other than the sellers."'1' The Court itself refused to "speculate upon
whether such a duty exists, whether it has been breached, or whether such a breach
constitutes a violation of Section 10(b)." 47
Justice Stevens, who provided the critical fifth vote for the majority
opinion, wrote separately to stress that the Supreme Court had not decided whether
Chiarella's "breach of his duty of silence-a duty he unquestionably owed to his
employer and to his employer's customers-could give rise to criminal liability
under Rule lOb-5.' 48 In Stevens' view,' 49
Respectable arguments could be made in support of either position.
On the one hand, if we assume that petitioner breached a duty to the
acquiring companies that had entrusted confidential information to
his employers, a legitimate argument could be made that his actions
142. 445 U.S. 222 (1980).
143. By way of historic origin, the misappropriation theory grew out of the
argument presented by the SEC and prosecutors to the Supreme Court in Chiarella. As an
alternate basis to strict lOb-5 analysis for supporting Chiarella's conviction, the government
urged that the court could find that Chiarella, by using information obtained in the course of
his employment, breached a duty owed to his employer (the print shop) and, thus, to his
employer's customers (the acquiring companies). It is interesting to note that posted on the
wall above Chiarella's station was a warning sign about the confidentiality of the material
with which he was working. He ignored and violated it, but the question was whether this
should be merely employee misconduct or a violation of federal law.
144. See Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 239.
145. Id. at 223.
146. Id. at 236.
147. Id. at 236-37.
148. Id. at 238.
149. Id.
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constituted "a fraud or a deceit" upon those companies "in
connection with the purchase or sale of any security." On the other
hand, inasmuch as those companies would not be able to recover
damages from petitioner for violating Rule 1Ob-5 because they were
neither purchasers nor sellers of target company securities, it could
also be argued that no actionable violation of Rule lOb-5 occurred. I
think the court wisely leaves the resolution of this issue for another
day. 150
On the other hand, Chief Justice Burger outright dissented, endorsing the
misappropriation theory, by stating:
In particular, the rule should give way when an informational
advantage is obtained, not by superior experience, foresight or
industry, but some unlawful means.... I would read [Section] 10(b)
and Rule lOb-5 to encompass and build on this principle: to mean
that a person who has misappropriated nonpublic information has an
absolute duty to disclose that information or to refrain from
trading.1
5 1
Justice Burger concluded that the government's alternative argument had been
properly presented to the jury. He voted to uphold Chiarella's conviction based on
the argument that a person who misappropriates nonpublic information has a duty
to disclose that information or to refrain from trading. Burger concluded that the
language of Rule lOb-5 imputes insider trading liability to "any person engaged in
a fraudulent scheme."'
152
He also noted that the two factors mentioned in Cady, Roberts53 that
impose a duty to disclose on corporate insiders-(l) access to information
intended to be available only for a corporate purpose, and (2) the inherent
unfairness in trading on such information when it is not public--do not necessarily
limit the application of federal securities laws to trading by corporate insiders who
use corporate information.
154
Thus, in Chiarella, four members of the Court indicated that liability for
insider trading could be imposed in the absence of a pre-existing relationship
between buyer and seller; however, the crucial fifth vote swinging the law toward
the prosecution was missing.
150. Id. (citation omitted). Justice Stevens' position-that he did not believe it
was the time for the High Court to address such a problem-changes eighteen years later,
when he becomes a key player in the current lineup of the Court. United States v. O'Hagan,
117 S. Ct. 2199 (1997).
151. Chiarella 445 U.S. at 240 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
152. Id.
153. In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961).
154. Previously, in Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, Justice Powell wrote for the
Court that § 10(b) and Rule lob-5 required scienter for liability. In that case, the Court
found that an allegedly negligent audit which led plaintiffs to buy and/or sell, was not
"aiding and abetting" nor a fraud on the market. Justice Blackmun strongly dissented. Later,
Powell would pose similar compelling arguments in Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646 (1983).
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C. Congress and the Second Circuit React
1. The Legislative Response
In apparent retaliation against Chiarella, four months later the SEC
adopted Rule 14e-3, under the 1934 Act.'55 The rule imposed a
duty of disclosure under Section 14(e) on any person who trades in
securities which will be sought.. .in a tender offer while that person
is in possession of material information which he knows or has
reason to know is nonpublic and has been acquired directly or
indirectly from the.. .issuer or from an officer, director, partner or
employee or any other person acting on behalf of the.. .issuer.'5 6
Clearly focusing on Chiarella, the SEC described the purpose of this new
Rule as follows: "[This] rule pertains to trading by persons in securities which may
be the subject of a tender offer as well as tipping of material, nonpublic
information relating to a contemplated tender offer. It should be noted that Rule
14e-3 applies only in the context of tender offers.'. 5 Thus, a new weapon was
made available to prosecutors.1
58
Interestingly, one question remaining after adoption of this Rule was
whether the "equal access to the stock market" theory was available to plaintiffs in
nontender offer cases. Justice Blackmun's dissent in Chiarella suggested that
certain situations may cause nondisclosure to violate §10(b) if one has a unique,
albeit temporary relationship with the issuer giving him superior information to the
general marketplace, for example, accountants, lawyers, or consultants working on
a particular project.'59 While no formal duty to disclose existed, Blackmun argued
none was needed."W In other words, the "disclose or abstain" rule was still viable.
2. The "Mother Court's"6 ' Response
a. United States v. Newman
Soon after the Supreme Court's decision in Chiarella, the SEC and lower
courts quickly embraced the misappropriation theory as a means to prosecute
trading by outsiders based upon insider information. In United States v.
Newman,'62 the SEC indicted James Newman, a registered securities trader and
analyst, and charged him with violating § 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 for his role in
155. Tender Offers, 45 Fed. Reg. 60,410 (1980) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R.
pt.240).
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. United States v. O'Hagan, 117 S. Ct. 2199 (1997), upheld this section of the
Act as a proper extension of the statutes' intent.
159. See Chiarella, 445 U.S. 222,248-51 (1980).
160. Id. at 251.
161. A remark attributable to Justice Blackmun in his dissent in Blue Chip Stamps
v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723,762 (1975).
162. 664 F.2d 12 (2d Cir. 1981).
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purchasing shares in tender offer target companies based on undisclosed
information about pending, but secret, mergers and acquisitions.163
Although Newman was not an employee of either investment banking
firm, the SEC charged that he was liable because he "aided, participated in and
facilitated Courtois and Antoniu in violating the fiduciary duties of honesty,
loyalty and silence owed directly to Morgan Stanley, Kuhn Loeb, and clients of
those investment banks."'' This language suggested that an employee's act of
fraud constitutes a lOb-5 violation. It was an attempt to remedy the deficiency
noted by the Supreme Court in Chiarella, where the government failed to charge
that Chiarella violated a duty to anyone other than the sellers of stock in the target
companies."'
On appeal by the United States, the Second Circuit reversed a lower court
dismissal and remanded the case.166 On the basis'of the misappropriation theory,
the court stated that Newman and his cohorts had, in effect, defrauded and "stolen"
(again, Chief Justice Burger's term) 67 the information entrusted to them. As
viewed by the court: 'Ty sullying the'reputations of [defendant's] employers as
safe repositories of client confidences, [Newman] and his cohorts defrauded those
employers as surely as if they took their money.""16 The Second Circuit interpreted
§ 10(b) to encompass virtually any activity that could be described as operating as
a "fraud or deceit upon any person 'in connection with the purchase or sale of any
security. '
Newman represented an expansion of the earlier case law in three
important respects.170 First, the Supreme Court had established that not every
163. Newman received nonpublic information about several merger and tender
offer targets from E. Jacques Courtois, Jr. and Adrain Antoniu, employees of the investment
banking firms of Morgan Stanley & Co., Inc., and Kuhn Loeb & Co., respectively, who had
misappropriated the information from their employers. Newman, thus a tippee, then passed
this information on to two of the other defendants who purchased stock of the target
companies. After the plans were publicly disclosed, the price of the target companies
increased, and the defendants sold their stock at a profit. Id. at 15.
164. Id. at 16.
165. The lower court dismissed the indictments because Newman had not
breached such a duty, holding that "there was no 'clear and definite statement' in the federal
securities laws which both antedated and proscribed the acts alleged in (the) indictment"
such as to give Newman a reasonable opportunity to know that, absent an independent duty
to disclose the nonpublic information his conduct would constitute fraud under Section
10(b) or Rule lOb-5. Id. at 14. The district court found that Newman was not under an
independent duty to disclose the pending takeovers to shareholders of the target companies
and therefore lacked the special relationship with the shareholders of the affected
corporation as required by the SEC in Cady, Roberts to give rise to such a duty. Indeed, it is
doubtful that the companies would have listened to such an outsider calling to reveal some
secret data.
166. Id. at 12.
167. See Chiarella v. U.S., 445 U.S. 222, 245 (1980).
168. Newman, 664 F.2d at 17 (citations omitted).
169. Id.
170. See David M. Brodsky, A Critique of the Misappropriation Theory of Insider
Trading, SB93 ALI-ABA 105, 123-24 (1977), for a good description of these points.
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instance of fraud would constitute a violation under § 10(b) or Rule 10b-5-in
other words, it was necessary that some element of deception, misrepresentation or
nondisclosure be present.' Second, the court had held that federal securities laws
required that the victim be a purchaser or seller of securities, not just an
employer.' Third, the court expanded § 10(b)'s requirement that the fraudulent
activity be "in connection with" the purchase or sale of securities.'
The Second Circuit's view of the composition of the U.S. Supreme Court
in Chiarella became critical to its own holding. Relying on the fact that the higher
court's Chiarella majority did not specifically rule on the feasibility of the
misappropriation theory and that Chief Justice Burger's dissent seemed to have at
least four, or possibly five, proponents, the Second Circuit basically determined
that Newman's cohort's misappropriation of information from their employers
constituted fraud.
The opinion did not answer the open issue concerning nondisclosure that
occupied the majority in Chiarella-the question whether the obligation to refrain
from trading is consistent with the fact that none of the defendants were under a
duty to disclose to the sellers of a target company's securities that a takeover
attempt was about to occur. Nor did the Newman decision discuss the implications
of Chiarella's holding that when an allegation of fraud is based on nondisclosure,
it must be rejected without a duty to speak.174
Under this view of the misappropriation theory, virtually any variety of
fraud that has even a remote connection to the purchase or sale of securities could
constitute a violation of § 10(b) or Rule lOb-5.175 The effect of Newman's holding
was to transform § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 from bans against securities fraud into
general prohibitions against unfairness in the securities marketplace: a position that
the Supreme Court seemed to explicitly reject in Chiarella and later decisions.
b. SEC v. Materia
With no response from the Supreme Court to Newman, four years later
the Second Circuit decided SEC v. Materia,176 a case very similar to Chiarella. The
171. See, e.g., Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Store, 421 U.S. 723 (1975).
172. Id. at 742.
173. Newman, 664 F.2d at 18.
174. This reference is to the common law definition of fraud by silence. The
Newman court, however, fashioned a variety of securities fraud out of a breach of duty to a
person (the investment banking firms, or their clients, the acquiring companies) other than a
purchaser or seller of securities in the target companies. In Newman, even though the fraud
was not against persons in their capacities as purchasers or sellers, the court held that the "in
connection with" requirement was met based on a finding that Newman's sole purpose in
misappropriating the information was to purchase stock in the target companies. The
Newman court shifted the analysis under § 10(b) away from the defrauded purchaser or
seller of securities and focused attention on the trader's relationship to the entity from which
the information was obtained.
175. Earlier in Superintendent of Insurance v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S.
6, 12-13 (1971), the Supreme Court described the "in connection with" test as being
satisfied if the fraud "touches" the investor's purchase or sale of securities.
176. 745 F.2d 197 (2d Cir. 1984).
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court again used the misappropriation theory to find a financial printing company's
employee liable for trading on information he obtained in the course of his
employment. 177
The SEC filed an enforcement action, charging that Materia violated
§ 10(b) and § 14(e), Rule 10b-5 and the newly created Rule 14e-3 by trading on
material, nonpublic information that he misappropriated from his employer and his
employer's clients. 178 The district court agreed, holding that he breached a
fiduciary duty owed to those parties. It enjoined Materia against future violations
and ordered him to repay almost $100,000 in profits.
Relying on Newman,7 9 the court held that the defendant's breach of his
duties of loyalty and trust to his employer was sufficient to impose liability, stating
that "[O]ne who misappropriates nonpublic information in breach of a fiduciary
duty and trades on that information to his advantage violates § 10(b) and Rule lOb-
5.,,180
With Newman and Materia, the Second Circuit voiced its acceptance of
the "misappropriation theory" as a viable weapon for imposing insider trading
liability. Moreover, its language remarkably presages Justice Ginsberg's recent
O'Hagan majority opinion. Thus Rule lOb-5 was broadened to cover both
breaches against nonmarket participants and breaches of duties outside of the
employment context. Thereafter, the theory was accepted by some courts outside
the Second Circuit.
c. The Supreme Court Does Not Back Down
In 1983, Justice Powell wrote the last of his three decisions, Dirks v.
SEC,18 restricting § 10(b). The SEC sued Dirks for violating Rule lOb-5, arguing
177. Like Vincent Chiarella, Anthony Materia was employed by a firm
specializing in the printing of financial documents. Materia, like Chiarella, uncovered the
identities of at least four tender offer targets from coded documents he handled at work.
Subsequently, Materia purchased stock in those companies and sold the stock for a
substantial profit after the offers were made public. These two cases seemed to be "on all
fours."
178. See Materia, 745 F.2d at 199-200.
179. See Newman, 664 F.2d at 14.
180. See Materia, 745 F.2d at 203.
181. Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 648 (1983). Dirks was an officer of a New York
brokerage firm which specialized in providing investment analysis to institutional investors
of insurance companies securities. He received information from Ronald Secrist, a former
officer of Equity Funding of America, a New York Stock Exchange company Dirks was
researching. Secrist alleged that Equity Funding was involved in overstating assets and
other fraudulent corporate practices. Acting as a precursor to today's whistle blower, Secrist
noted that various regulatory agencies had failed to respond to this information. He urged
Dirks to verify the fraud and disclose it publicly. Dirks then confirmed this information by
talking to other former and present officers of the company. While his investigation was
ongoing, Dirks discussed the information he had with the SEC and the Wall Street Journal,
both of which also declined to act. Although neither Dirks nor his firm traded on the
information, some of his clients with whom he had discussed the information, including five
investment advisors, promptly sold holdings worth over $16 million dollars, avoiding major
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that Dirks was guilty by repeating the allegations of fraud to members of the
investment community who later sold their Equity Funding stock.182 The Supreme
Court rejected this theory,"' again reversing the Court of Appeals. It held that
Dirks had not violated Rule lOb-5 because he had no duty in this fact situation to
abstain from the use of the inside information he had obtained.'
Consistent with Chiarella, and again rejecting the "equal access to the
stock market" rationale, the majority articulated the circumstances in which an
outside tippee may violate Rule lOb-5 by trading on information obtained from an
inside tipper."' The court cited a two-step approach.
First, the insider (tipper) himself must have breached his own fiduciary
duty of confidentiality to his firm in disclosing the information to the tippee.
Whether the disclosure is a breach of duty depends on the purpose of the
disclosure. If the insider will personally benefit directly or indirectly from the
disclosure, then there is a breach. Absent personal gain (albeit not necessarily
pecuniary), the insider does not breach his fiduciary duty by disclosure of material,
nonpublic information to a person who either trades on that information or gives it
to others who trade on it, thus leaving the scienter requirement intact.8 6
Second, the tippee must know or have reason to know that the insider
breached his fiduciary duty by disclosing the information. If these two steps are
shown, the tippee will inherit the insider's duty and be found liable. As stated by
the court, the tippee's obligation arises as a "participant after the fact" in the
insider's breach. Secrist was merely a whistle blower with good intention and did
not breach a duty."' Thus, neither did Dirks.
Lastly, in addition to the "tipper/tippee" analysis, the Supreme Court set
forth, in the now famous footnote fourteen of its opinion, the definition of a
"constructive" insider.
[W]here corporate information is revealed legitimately to an
underwriter, accountant, lawyer, or consultant working for the
corporation, these outsiders may become fiduciaries of the
shareholders. The basis for recognizing this fiduciary duty is... [if]
they have entered into a special confidential relationship in the
conduct of the business of the enterprise and are given access to
information solely for corporate purposes. When such a person
losses when the fraud was revealed and the stock plummeted.
Over the two-week period that Dirks pursued his investigation and spread word of
Secrist's charges, the price of Equity Funding stock fell from $26 a share to $11 per share.
This led the New York Stock Exchange to halt trading. Shortly thereafter, California
insurance authorities uncovered evidence of fraud by Equity Funding. Only then did the
SEC file a complaint against the firm.
182. Id. at 655-56.
183. Id. at 656-57.
184. Id. at 665-67.
185. Id. at 660--64.
186. Id. at 654, 660-64.
187. Id. at 655, 660.
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breaches his fiduciary relationship, he may be treated more properly
as a tipper than a tippee."'
The Supreme Court essentially said that even temporary relationships can create a
fiduciary relationship to a corporation, and trades or tips based on information
acquired during that time are violations of Rule lOb-5.
d. Aftermath of Chiarella and Dirks: The Effect of the Court's Narrow
Approach
The Chiarella and Dirks decisions limited insider trading liability to two
groups: traditional corporate insiders and tippees of insiders who knew that the
insider was receiving a personal benefit from the tip (for example, the tippee paid
the insider for the tip). Unlike the "equal access to the stock market" test, this
fiduciary duty standard adopted by the Court did not protect market participants
generally by promoting equal access to material information by all participants.
189
Some examples soon followed showing the limits of guilty behavior.
In SEC v. Switzer,' 90 a federal district court absolved football coach Barry
Switzer of liability under the Dirks standard when he acted only as an
eavesdropper of material information on which he profited. The court held that his
acquaintance had not breached a duty himself and no benefit accrued to the
executive.' 91
In United States v. Reed,"9 a federal district court used Dirks to acquit a
son who acted on material insider information told to him by his father.'93 Under
the "equal access" test used in Texas Gulf Sulphur,'94 both of these actions would
188. Id. at 655 n.14 (citations omitted).
189. See Richard M. Phillips & Robert J. Zutz, The Insider Trading Doctrine: A
Need for Legislative Repair, 13 HOFSTRA L. REV. 65 (1984); Barbara Bader Aldave,
Misappropriation: A General Theory of Liability for Trading on Nonpublic Information, 13
HOFSTRAL. Rv. 101, 120 (1984).
190. 590 F. Supp. 756 (W.D. Okla. 1984). Barry Switzer, then the coach of the
University of Oklahoma football team, attended a high school track meet in which his son
was competing. While allegedly sunbathing in the bleachers, he claimed to have overheard a
high powered corporate executive and his wife, whom he knew, talking about some material
good news affecting their publicly traded business. Immediately after hearing this
information, Switzer organized a group of 30 people who purchased 36,000 shares of stock
in the company's affiliate. After a favorable public announcement was made several days
later, the group sold the stock, making a $600,000 profit, and the SEC sued.
191. Id. at 762, 766.
192. 601 F. Supp. 685 (S.D.N.Y. 1985), rev'd, 773 F.2d 477 (2d Cir. 1985). The
defendant learned from his father, a member of the board of directors of Amax Corporation,
that the company had entered into nonpublic confidential discussions with another
corporation for its acquisition at a premium price. The father testified that he gave his son
this information in confidence with the expectation that it would not be disclosed, instead,
the defendant immediately purchased call options on Amax shares. Several days later, the
merger was announced which contained an offer to purchase shares at more than double the
trading price. On a relatively small investment, the defendant was able to make a $700,000
profit.
193. Id. at 703.
194. SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 848-49 (2d Cir. 1968).
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have resulted in convictions. The outsider defendants knew that they were acting
on material, nonpublic information received from insiders. However, in neither
case could it be shown that the insider tipper received a benefit from the
disclosure. While lower courts and commentators debated the so-called
misappropriation theory, the Supreme Court had yet to deal with it directly.
1 95
Chiarella disappointed securities law practitioners when the case turned
on improper jury instructions and not the misappropriation theory. Dirks also
failed to answer all questions on misappropriation because Secrist, the insider, was
an innocent whistle blower. However, the parity of information and equal access
rationales seemed to have been tabled. While this stopped the government from
bringing prosecutions and enforcement actions based solely on this theory and
from arguing that mere possession of nonpublic information created a duty to
disclose or abstain from trading, it did not prevent a new, clever twist on this
emerging theory. A person commits fraud, it was argued by the SEC, "in
connection with" a securities transaction, and therefore violates § 10(b) and Rule
lOb-5, when he misappropriates confidential information for securities trading
purposes in breach of a duty he owes to the source of the information-not
necessarily the issuer-but merely the tipper .196
VI. THE DIVIDED COURTS
A. The Second Circuit's Apogee with Misappropriation-United States v.
Carpenter
A dramatic expansion of the misappropriation theory occurred by the
Second Circuit in United States v. Carpenter,97 probably the most well known of
the misappropriation theory cases.
In upholding a defendant's criminal convictions under Rule lOb-5 for
using insider information which a journalist had obtained and used, the Second
Circuit pointed out that the employer, The Wall Street Journal had a policy that
information obtained in the course of employment belonged to the paper and was
195. See Brodsky, supra note 170, at 120; Alison Grey Anderson, Fraud,
Fiduciaries, and Insider Trading, 10 HoSTRA L. REv. 341 (1982).
t 196. How long this new rationale would go untested became the key question in
the late 1980s. See, e.g., Michael P. Kenny & Teresa D. Thebaut, Misguided Statutory
Construction to Cover the Corporate Universe: The Misappropriation Theory of Section
10(b), 59 ALB. L. REv. 139 (1995); Stephen M. Bainbridge, Incorporating State Law
Fiduciary Duties into the Federal Insider Trading Prohibition, 52 WASH. & LEE L. REV.
1189, 1193 (1995).
197. 791 F.2d 1024 (2d Cir. 1986). R. Foster Winans worked for the Wall Street
Journal as a writer for its "Heard on the Street" column. Winans entered into a scheme to
leak the timing and contents of future columns to Carpenter and others, days prior to
publication so that they could purchase stocks before the column appeared. Winans also was
charged with providing two stockbrokers at Kidder Peabody, Kenneth P. Fells and Peter
Brant, with securities-related information that was scheduled to appear in the columns,
information which the stockbrokers then used to buy or sell the subject securities. Over a
relatively short period of time, the defendants were able to accumulate almost $690,000 in
profits.
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required to be kept confidential (not unlike the posted warning sign in Chiarella).
The writer breached this duty when he traded on the information for his own
personal gain.' 98
The court further noted that while there was no violation under Dirks
because neither the writer nor the Journal owed a duty to those corporations which
the reporter wrote about, Dirks was not controlling because it did not address the
misappropriation theory."9 Stressing the "broad remedial purposes of the securities
laws," the court held that "misuse of corporate inside information is not the only
type of fraud that the securities laws cover," but they apply to "all 'manipulative
and deceptive practices which have been demonstrated to fulfill no useful
function."'20
B. The Supreme Court's Second Chance to Resolve the Issue
Once more, like in Dirks, the stage was set for the Supreme Court to
finally rule on the misappropriation theory. Again, those following this law would
be disappointed. The commentators and industry personnel fully expected Justices
Rehnquist (author of Blue Chip Stamps), White (author of Santa Fe Industries v.
Green) and Powell (author of Ernst & Ernst, Dirks, and Chiarella,) to lead the
court into a final rejection of this theory and yet another reversal of the Second
Circuit.
Ironically, Justice White would write the Carpenter2"' opinion, but due to
a quirk in timing in which Justice Kennedy was not yet seated, the Supreme Court,
by a four-to-four vote, had to affirm the conviction of Carpenter under securities
and mail fraud' 2 laws. Without analysis of the Rule 10b-5 issues, Justice White
simply indicated that the Court was evenly divided on whether misappropriation of
property falls within the purviews of § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 and placed his entire
affirmation of the conviction on the mail fraud theory.
0 3
The Carpenter case represented an exceptionally broad use of laws
intended to prohibit insider trading in several respects. First, the information in the
Heard on the Street columns was in no sense "inside" information. In fact, all of
the information contained in the articles was public information. It was only the
fact of publication, date of the columns, and general tenor of the articles, not their
informational content, that was. nonpublic. Second, the articles themselves were
not published for the purpose of manipulating the price of the stock. Rather, the
court found that the articles were accurate to the best of Winans' knowledge and
the subject matter was chosen on the basis of journalistic merit. Finally, Winans
was even more of an outsider than the defendants in other misappropriation cases,
198. Id.
199. Id. at 1028-29.
200. Id. at 1029-30.
201. Carpenter v. U.S., 484 U.S. 19 (1987).
202. See 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1994); 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (1994); 18 U.S.C. § 1343
(1994).
203. Carpenter, 484 U.S. at 25-28.
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and the connection between Winans' "fraud" and the securities transactions that
formed the basis of the conviction were much more tenuous.2°4
In contrast, the Wall Street Journal in Carpenter had no relationship with,
and owed no duty to, any of the companies about which Winans wrote. Winans'
misappropriation did not violate a duty owed to any party engaged in the securities
transactions that formed the predicate for his conviction. It seemed to imply that
any embezzlement from one's employer, where the employee later uses the
proceeds to purchase stock, constitutes securities fraud. If so, it is difficult to
understand how the goal of § 10(b) and Rule lOb-5---"to protect persons who are
deceived in securities transactions"-was furthered by the application of the
insider trading laws to these situations.' 5
The Carpenter decision also resulted in illogical distinctions concerning
who may use the same information. Because the facts used in the article were
public, anyone could have traded lawfully on the basis of the facts presented in
them. Had Winans chosen not to write an article about a particular company, he
apparently could have traded in that company's stock using the information
obtained for the article.
Moreover, Winans' wrongful conduct was based entirely on the Journal's
internal policy that deemed all materials gleaned by an employee during the course
of employment to be company property, and reqired employees to treat nonpublic
information learned on the job as confidential. If the Journal had had no such
policy, Winans would not have been deemed to have violated the federal securities
laws. It also would seem that Dow Jones & Co., owner of the Journal, could, itself,
have traded on advance knowledge of the articles without violating the federal
securities laws because the Journal could not logically misappropriate its own
property.'
While the Supreme Court was forced to affirm the Second Circuit
convictions on both counts, it had said earlier, "an affirmance by an evenly divided
204. In both Newman and Materia the employers were temporary insiders of their
clients, the acquiring companies, and owed those companies a duty of loyalty and
confidentiality. These duties passed on to their employees, Newman's cohorts and Materia.
Although Newman and Materia can be criticized for applying liability under § 10(b) where
the defendants owed no duty to the issuer corporation's shareholders and the fraud was not
perpetrated against the buyer or seller of securities, at least those cases identified a duty
running between defendants and entities connected in some way to the securities transaction
from which they are alleged to have wrongly profited.
205. See Chemical Bank v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 726 F.2d 930, 943 (2d Cir.
1984). (Friendly J.) (Justice Friendly indicated a negative view toward the implied private
cause of action in TGS, holding that misrepresentation or omission involved in a securities
transaction that does not pertain to the value of the securities cannot form the basis of a
§ 10(b) violation.).
206. Carpenter, 484 U.S. at 25-28.
207. This result indicated yet another extension of Newman and Materia in which
it also would have been unlawful for the defrauded employers, Morgan Stanley & Bowne
Printing Co., respectively, to have traded on the basis of the misappropriated information.
These are strange results indeed for a theory designed to bring about greater information
equality.
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court [is not] entitled to precedential weight.""2 8 Thus, ultimate judicial support for
the misappropriation theory was still inconclusive.
C. Subsequent Expansion Within the Second Circuit
The Second Circuit's decision in Carpenter constituted a huge doctrinal
leap from criminalizing breaches against market participants to a broader universe
of nonmarket participants. While Carpenter was in the context of employment,
other courts extended the misappropriation theory to criminalize breaches of duties
in contexts in which the expectations of the parties were very different from an
employer/employee relationship.
1. United States v. Reed-A Reprise
Recall that in Reed,2" the court held that a son's breach of a trust
relationship with his father was sufficient basis for a § 10(b) indictment. The court
looked to the common law regarding confidentiality and determined that a familial
relationship was the type whose breach in connection with the purchase or sale of
securities created criminal liability under § 10(b). Rejecting a narrower view of the
breach of the securities laws, the Second Circuit held that the concept of
confidential relationship is, by nature, flexible and defiant of precise definition.
210
2. United States v. Willis
In Willis,2" the misappropriation theory was held to encompass a
psychiatrist's use of information revealed by a patient.
212
A federal district court convicted a doctor who used material insider
information obtained from a patient about her husband's business. Relying on the
Carpenter"3 decision, the court reiterated that the critical relationship "is the one
between the misappropriator and the person to whom the misappropriator owes a
fiduciary duty, and not the relationship between such person and any insider
source of the information. 2 4
This rule, the court reasoned, is based on the misappropriation theory's
focus on "the relationship between the misappropriator and the person to whom he
208. Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, 192 (1972).
209. 601 F. Supp. 685 (S.D.N.Y. 1985), rev'd, 773 F.2d 477 (2d Cir. 1985).
210. Id.
211. 737 F. Supp. 269 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
212. Id. at 274-75. The wife of prominent executive Sanford Weill told her
psychiatrist, Dr. Robert Willis, about her husband's efforts to become CEO of Bank of
America. Willis made a profit by purchasing shares in Bank of America prior to the public
announcement of Weill's effort, and selling them a day later. The district court upheld the
indictment which was premised on the misappropriation theory.
Willis initially pled guilty to charges that he violated § 10(b) under the
misappropriation theory, however, after the United States v. Chestman, 947 F.2d 551 (2d
Cir. 1991) decision.
213. See Willis, 737 F. Supp. at 274-75.
214. United States v. Willis, 778 F. Supp. 205, 208 (S.D.N.Y 1991).
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owes an obligation of confidentiality,.215 not that the breach of a duty relates to a
corporation or its shareholders. The court found that the relationship of importance
was that of the doctor and patient, not the husband and wife, and denied this
contention.
In addressing Willis' second argument, the court looked at what was
contemplated by a fiduciary relationship, specifically, "[a] fiduciary relationship
involves discretionary authority and dependency: One person depends on
another-the fiduciary-to serve his interests."21 6 Further,
in relying on a fiduciary to act for his benefit, the beneficiary of the
relation may entrust the fiduciary with custody over property of one
sort or another. Because the fiduciary obtains access to this property
to serve the ends of the fiduciary relationship, he becomes duty-
bound not to appropriate the property for his own use.217
The court easily found a fiduciary relationship based on Willis' oath of
confidentiality to his patients as a doctor, because "the patient depends on the
psychiatrist to serve her interests."2 8
In this aspect the patient may entrust the psychiatrist with the custody of
material, nonpublic information that the psychiatrist is now duty bound to not
employ.21 9 Therefore, Willis did misappropriate the information that he learned
from his patient, and he subsequently had a duty to either disclose his superior
information prior to trading or abstain from trading altogether. Because he failed to
reveal his superior information prior to its use, the court denied Willis' second
contention.
The Willis decision not only reaffirmed the misappropriation theory, but
actually expanded it by endorsing a specific type of fiduciary relationship that
satisfies the theory. This is contrary to what the court in Chestman had desired, as
the Willis court further removed the misappropriation theory from the securities
market.' ° Thus, due to the broad interpretation of insider trading laws, Willis fell
within the reach of § 10(b) and Rule lOb-5.
The Second Circuit"2 did not address the significant shift it was making
by bringing the physician/patient relationship within the purview of the federal
securities laws. Instead, the court focused on the confidential nature of such
relationships, explaining that "it was difficult to imagine a relationship that
requires a higher degree of trust and confidence.... "222
215. Id. at 209.
216. Id.
217. Id.
218. Id.
219. Id.
220. Id.
221. Id. Four separate opinions were generated based upon the facts of this case;
however, only the two cited are relevant to this analysis. 778 F. Supp. 205,(S.D.N.Y 1991);
737 F. Supp. 269 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
222. United States v. Willis, 737 F. Supp. 269,272 (1990).
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3. United States v. Chestman
Then in Chestman,m the en banc Second Circuit reviewed the conviction
of a stockbroker, Robert Chestman, who profited from information heard from a
customer concerning a business owned by his wife's family.
Voting five to five with one abstention, the Second Circuit upheld
Chestman's convictions under Rule 14e-3(a), but reversed those under § 10(b).224
The court held that Loeb's relationship with his wife's family was not a fiduciary
one. However, the court distinguished Chestman's case from Reed' because, in
the latter, there were repeated disclosures between father and son of business
secrets that that court believed was enough to find a breach of a familial duty
leading to a § 10(b) violation. 2 6
D. Acceptance of the Doctrine in Other Circuits
In the years following the Second Circuit's adoption of the
misappropriation doctrine, the theory was argued to courts in other jurisdictions
and was "welcomed by circuit and district courts alike.""22 Following the lead set
by the Second Circuit in Newman, the Third Circuit indicated a willingness to
follow the misappropriation theory in Rothberg v. Rosenbloom."8 The trial court
found that liability was established because of a breach of duty to his corporation,
thereby establishing a violation under the analysis in Newman. The Third Circuit
affirmed229 and other courts soon followed.
In 1990, the Ninth Circuit in SEC v. Clark"30 adopted the same definition
of the misappropriation theory developed by the Second Circuit. A jury acquitted
223. 947 F.2d 551 (2d Cir. 1991). Keith Loeb, a client, informed Chestman that
his wife, a member of the Waldbaum family, which owned the Waldbaum supermarket
chain, had told him that a controlling block of Waldbaum shares would soon be sold to
another company, A & P. Thereupon, Chestman purchased Waldbaum stock for his own
account and for the accounts of several clients, including Keith Loeb. After A & P's tender
offer was publicly announced, the price of the Waldbaum stock nearly doubled. An
investigation into the transactions in the stock ensued, and Loeb cooperated with the
government. Chestman was indicted for securities fraud and was eventually convicted by a
jury.
224. Id. at 571.
225. U.S. v. Reed, 601 F. Supp. 685 (S.D.N.Y. 1985), rev'd, 773 F.2d 477 (2d
Cir. 1985). See supra text accompanying notes 209-10.
226. Id. at 709-13.
227. SEC v. Clark, 915 F.2d 439,448 (9th Cir. 1990).
228. 771 F.2d 818 (3d Cir. 1985), rev'd on other grounds, 808 F.2d 252 (3d Cir.
1986). Rothberg involved investors who were also board members of certain companies and
purchased stocks based on material nonpublic information. In two instances, Rothberg
bought shares in a publicly known target company without disclosing material nonpublic
information and was convicted of violating § 10(b). In Rothberg, the court does not
explicitly mention the misappropriation theory but makes reference to Newman. See id. at
822.
229. Id. at 824.
230. 915 F.2d 439 (9th Cir. 1990). Clark was a member of a medical supply
company's acquisition team. In this capacity, Clark knew of a proposed takeover and
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the broker but found that Clark violated Rule lOb-5 by misappropriating and
trading on material, nonpublic information. On appeal, the Clark court stated that
"the misappropriation theory fits comfortably within the meaning of 'fraud' within
§ 10(b) and Rule lOb-5... [as long as the fraud is] 'in connection with the purchase
or sale of any security."' M
In a somewhat extraordinary conclusion, the Ninth Circuit further held
that Clark, the employee, could be required to repay the profits made by his
stockbroker (who also traded without disclosure of the material nonpublic
information provided by Clark), even though the stockbroker was not found by the
jury to have violated any federal securities laws. 2
The following year, the Seventh Circuit relied on Clark, Rothberg, and
Newman in support of its own adoption of the misappropriation theory in SEC v.
Cherif."3 The court found that a person violates § 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 when he
trades on material nonpublic information that was misappropriated in a breach of a
fiduciary relationship such as employment."
Thus, the Second, Third, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits had all adopted the
misappropriation theory in substantially the same form. Each Circuit accepted the
rationale of Newman, and each built on the precedent established by the other
circuits. In all of those opinions, § 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 are violated when one
misappropriates material nonpublic information in the breach of a fiduciary duty or
directed his stockbroker to purchase two thousand shares of the target company. From these
purchases, Clark realized profits of over $47,000 and his broker gained over $7500.
231. Id. at 449.
232. This rationale had its precursor in SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d
833 (1968). When that matter was retried upon remand, the previously convicted company
geologist Mr. Darke, was then ordered to pay to his former employer (Texas Gulf) an
amount equal to all of the profits which his tippees made on their own sales of the stock
based on his advice. On this point, the court stated:
As to the requirement that Darke make restitution for the profits derived
by his tippees, admittedly more of a hardship is imposed. However,
without such a remedy, insiders could easily evade their duty to refrain
from trading on the basis of inside information. Either the transactions so
traded could be concluded by a relative or an acquaintance of the insider,
or implied understandings could arise under which reciprocal tips
between insiders in different corporations could be given.
SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co. 446 F.2d 1301, 1308 (1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1005
(1971).
Subsequent decisions also held that full restitution (again the inflammatory word
"disgorgement" is used) may be obtained from tippees as well as their insider-tippers. SEC
v. Lund, 570 F. Supp. 1397, 1399 (C.D. Cal 1983).
233. 933 F.2d 403 (7th Cir. 1991). Cherif was an employee of First National Bank
of Chicago. When his position was eliminated due to reorganization, Cherif kept his
magnetic office access card which he managed to keep activated. In knowing violation of an
"integrity policy" Cherif signed while still an employee, he misappropriated material,
nonpublic information about tender offers after his employment was terminated. Cherif
made substantial profits while trading on the misappropriated nonpublic information.
234. ld. at 410.
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similar relationship of trust or confidence and uses that information in connection
with a securities transaction.'2 5
These decisions are noteworthy not just for their snowballing effect but
also for the minimal scrutiny applied when considering the theory's legitimacy.
The opinions rely on Newman without considering its long term implications,
declining to revisit the "issues of statutory construction and legislative history"
raised by the misappropriation theory because these issues had been addressed by
the other courts. Most interestingly, the U.S. Supreme Court denied certiorari in
every one of them. The courts thus remained divided,236 but why the Court
continuously denied certiorari in cases needing an ultimate resolution while
hearing those involving traditional lOb-5 arguments was unclear.
Before proceeding to O'Hagan, it is instructive to review two Supreme
Court Rule lOb-5 decisions announced in the midst of this lower court split on the
viability of the misappropriation doctrine. Basic Inc. v. Levinson23 and Central
Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, 8 became two conflicting
opinions determined, like Carpenter, by the philosophy and composition of the
Justices then seated on the High Court. 9
E. Justices Blackmun and White: The Tables Are Turned for a Moment
Basic Inc. v. Levinson24 was decided in 1988, just one year after the court
voted four to four to uphold Carpenter's conviction, a case in which Justice
Kennedy was not yet seated."' Following years of writing the dissents in this area,
Justice Blackmun would now get his opportunity. He formulated a four to two
plurality opinion which essentially affirmed the Texas Gulf Sulphur doctrine. This
unique composition of the court occurred because Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice
235. In United States v. Libera, 989 F.2d 596 (2d Cir. 1993), the Second Circuit
did hold tippees liable for receiving early editions of Business Week and trading its news
before the magazine hit the newstands.
236. See Cherif, 933 F.2d at 403; Rothberg v. Rosenbloom, 771 F.2d 818 (3d Cir.
1985), rev'd on other grounds, 808 F.2d 252 (3d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1017
(1987); United States v. Newman, 664 F.2d at 12 (1981), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 863 (1983).
237. 485 U.S. 224 (1988).
238. 511 U.S. 164 (1994).
239. These holdings set the stage for the decision on the validity of the
misappropriation theory which the court would finally render in O'Hagan.
240. Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224 (1988).
241. Most SEC observers expected that Justice Kennedy would have voted to
reverse the convictions. See, e.g., Troy Cichos, The Misappropriation Theory of Insider
Trading: Its Past, Present, and Future, 18 SEATTLE U. L. RaV. 389, 391 (1995); Hall, supra
note 5; Kim Lane Scheppele, "It's Just Not Right": The Ethics of Insider Trading, 56 LAw
& CONTEMP. PROBS. 123, 123 (1993); William K.S. Wang, The "Contemporaneous"
Traders Who Can Sue an Insider Trader, 38 HASTINGS L.J. 1175 (1987); Christine Marra,
Note, The Misappropriation Theory: A Practical Means of Imposing Rule lOb-S Liability,
24 U. RICH. L. REv. 211, 211 n.1 (1990). Cf. HENRY G. MANNE, INSIDER TRADING AND THE
STOCK MARKET (1966).
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Scalia and, again, Justice Kennedy took no part in the consideration or decision of
the case. 2
Blackmun said that certain corporate press releases regarding a possible
merger were misleading by omitting the details of the transaction and thus, the
defendant company committed a "fraud on the marketplace."" 3 This made the
burden of proof for the plaintiff extremely easy, creating a rebuttable presumption
of reliance and causation by people who traded-even if they never knew who the
defendant was before the litigation.
Basically the Court held that (1) the standard of materiality in an earlier
case, TSC Industries,' was appropriate in a § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 context; (2)
"materiality" in mergers depends upon the probability that the transaction will be
consummated; 245 and (3) there is a presumption of reliance when a "fraud-on-the-
market" occurs, although the presumption is rebuttable.' In reality, this
presumption of reliance and even causation was virtually absolute for those who
innocently trade if others possess inside information;' a major shift to assist the
prosecution. While not a misappropriation case, the underlying doctrines of "equal
access," "fraud on the market," and even "fairness" were characterized in broad,
pro-plaintiff terms.' This case, along with the Supreme Court's four to four
decision in Carpenter set the stage for subsequent cases in the 1990s Court.2 49
242. The dispute in Basic developed out of a merger agreement between Basic,
Incorporated and Combustion Engineering Corp. For two years, representatives of the two
companies had various meetings and conversations regarding the possibility of a merger.
Over that time, Basic made three public denials, indicating that while it was involved in
merger negotiations, it considered them minor and did not refer to their nature or status.
After the suspension of the trading of Basic stock due to extraordinary volume
just prior to the actual merger, former Basic shareholders who had sold their stock following
Basic's first public denial filed a class action against Basic and its directors for violations of
§ 10(b) and Rule lb-5. Since the company's press releases had not described the nature
and extent of the merger discussions, individual plaintiffs who bought or sold during that
time claimed that they would have done something differently had they known the details of
the merger. Because Justices Rehnquist, Kennedy, and Scalia did not participate for
undisclosed reasons, Justice Blackmun was able to persuade three other Justices to join in
his opinion upholding this class action lOb-5 case.
243. Basic, 485 U.S. at 248.
244. Id. at 231 (citing TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438 (1976)).
245. Id. at 238.
246. Id. at 246.
247. Ironically, although espousing a philosophy of giving all investors equal
access to information in an efficient market, Justice Blackmun did not offer any guidance of
when a company must disclose merger negotiations. He suggested that "No Comment" may
be a better response. Yet that approach would result in no information being distributed out
of caution; the exact opposite of creating a "market of equal access." Id. at 239 n.17.
248. Id. at 228-30.
249. In the strong-worded dissent, Justices White and O'Connor said that it would
be absurd for a company to have to disclose every time it had the slightest possibility or
interest in a particular transaction. The marketplace would be flooded with data and
therefore rumors. They suggested that the information needs to be "material," which means
that the merger has to be at an "agreement in principle" stage, to avoid speculation.
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F. Justice Kennedy's Turn to Take a Stand
Central Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver,25° was a last
moment of triumph for those seeking to limit 10(b). The Supreme Court in Central
Bank overturned several circuit courts by eliminating the private cause of action
against those allegedly aiding and abetting a violation of Rule lOb-5.
Speaking through Justice Kennedy, whose absence from the Carpenter
and Basic cases materially influenced their outcomes, the court applied a strict
textual interpretation to the Securities Act and found that while § 10(b) prohibits
the making of material misstatements or the omission or commission of
manipulative acts, it does not prohibit the giving of aid to one who commits the
manipulative or deceptive act.
The Tenth Circuit concluded that to find a violation of § 10(b) for "aiding
and abetting," one needed: (1) a primary violation of § 10(b); and (2) recklessness
by the aider and abettor."5 Applying the standard, the court found that a guarantor
bank's officers were aware of an inflated appraisal which led investors to purchase
bonds which later defaulted. The court found that the alleged inadequacies in the
appraisal raised issues of material fact regarding the recklessness element needed
to establish liability for "aiding and abetting" a Rule 10b-5 violation.252
The bank's petition for certiorari on the issues of whether it could be
liable as an aider and abettor without a breach of the indenture agreement and
250. 511 U.S. 164 (1994). In Central Bank, the local Public Building Authority in
1986 issued $26 million in bonds to finance public improvements in Stetson Hills, a planned
residential and commercial development in Colorado Springs. Central Bank served as an
indenture trustee for the bonds, which were secured by landowner assessment liens. A key
covenant required that the land subject to the lien had to be worth at least 160% of the value
of the bonds' outstanding principal and interest amount. The developer, AmWest
Development, was to provide Central Bank with an annual report demonstrating that the
160% requirement was fulfilled.
Two years later, Central Bank received AmWest's updated appraisal of the land
securing the bonds. Upon reviewing the report, the underwriter wrote to Central Bank
expressing a concern as to falling real estate prices in the area and that Central Bank was
operating on appraisal values over sixteen months old. Thereafter, Central Bank's in-house
appraiser reviewed the updated appraisal and concluded that the figures were optimistic. He
suggested that an outside appraisal be independently conducted. After an exchange of letters
between Central Bank and AmWest, Central Bank agreed to delay the appraisal until the
end of the year. The Authority then defaulted on the bonds before the independent review
was completed.
I As a result of the default, First Interstate Bank and the individual purchasers of
the bonds sued the Authority, the underwriter, ajunior underwriter, an AmWest director and
Central Bank for violation of § 10(b). First Interstate alleged, among other things, that
Central Bank was secondarily liable for aiding and abetting the fraud committed by the
bond issuer and underwriters because of its overvalued appraisal. The United States District
Court for the District of Colorado granted summary judgment to Central Bank. However,
the Tenth Circuit reversed, holding that the defendant's conduct was reckless, and
"recklessness" was a sufficient basis for aiding and abetting liability under § 10(b). Id. at
167-68.
251. Central Bank of Denver v. Pring, 969 F.2d 891 (10th Cir. 1992).
252. Id. at 898.
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whether recklessness was sufficient for liability was granted. However, the U.S.
Supreme Court also directed the parties to address in their briefs an additional
threshold question of whether there was a federal, private right of action for aiding
and abetting a violation of § 10(b).3
When it heard the case, the Supreme Court concluded that no such right
existed. Justice Kennedy emphasized that the scope of conduct prohibited by
§ 10(b) is controlled by a strict reading of the text of the statute. The "aiding and
abetting" argument must fail because the allegations of fraud were not "in
connection with" the sale or purchase of securities.2 4
The Court basically affirmed Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder25 for support
of a strict statutory construction of § 10(b). In Ernst & Ernst, the Court had
required scienter as opposed to mere negligence because the statutory language of
§ 10(b) strongly suggested that the conduct intended to be proscribed was
"knowing" and "intentional," adding that if it was to only require negligence, it
would "add a gloss to the operative language of the statute quite different from its
commonly accepted meaning.",16 In essence, the Court in Ernst & Ernst utilized a
strict interpretation of § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 to undermine additional meanings to
§ 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 violations. 7
Relying on the strict construction analysis provided in Ernst & Ernst, the
Central Bank Court found that "the statutory text controls the definition of conduct
covered by § 10(b)." 258 The Court went further stating that "the language of
§ 10(b) does not in terms mention aiding and abetting" 9
First Interstate argued that while the text of § 10(b) does not specifically
refer to aiding and abetting liability, the phrase "directly or indirectly" covers such
acts. The Court held that the statutory silence rejects the conclusion despite the
findings of several Courts of Appeals to the contrary. 2" The Court also justified its
narrow reading of § 10(b) in part by relying on the fact that the securities market is
"an area that demands certainty and predictability. 261 The Court found that broad
and unclear interpretations of § 10(b) create "uncertainty and excessive
litigation."
26 2
The guidelines provided in Central Bank for interpreting § 10(b) liability
become especially important when analyzing the viability of new theories such as
misappropriation. That theory appears, on its face, to be a stretch of the boundaries
of statutory construction. Under the analysis provided in Central Bank, it appeared
253. 508 U.S. 959 (1993).
254. Central Bank, 511 U.S. at 173.
255. 425 U.S. 185 (1976).
256. Id. at 199.
257. Id.
258. Central Bank, 511 U.S. at 175.
259. Id. at 175.
260. Cleary v. Perfectune, Inc., 700 F.2d 774 (1st Cir. 1983); Kerbs v. Fall River
Industries, 502 F.2d 731 (10th Cir. 1974); Brennan v. Midwestern United Life, 259 F. Supp.
673 (N.D. Ind. 1966), aff'd, 417 F.2d 147 (7th Cir. 1969).
261. Central Bank, 511 U.S. at 188.
262. Id. at 189.
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that the misappropriation theory would not hold up if heard by the Supreme Court.
Thus, despite the split between the Fourth and Eighth Circuits which rejected the
misappropriation theory and the Second, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits that accepted
it, the Supreme Court still did not act.
G. Rejected by Fourth and Eighth Circuits
Although the misappropriation theory enjoyed nearly one decade of
federal court approval, the Fourth Circuit in United States v. Bryan,263 and more
recently, the Eighth Circuit in United States v. O'Hagan,2" denied its legitimacy.
In Bryan, the court held that the misappropriation theory had no foundation in law
and was not a viable theory of liability.26 The counts included perjury as well as
mail and wire fraud. 26 In O'Hagan, the Eighth Circuit adopted the totality of the
reasoning of the Bryan court. A closer examination of these lower court decisions
sets the stage for the surprising recent reversal by the Supreme Court.
The misappropriation theory was an issue of first impression before the
Fourth Circuit. The court concluded that nothing in the statutory language of
§ 10(b) or Rule lOb-5 or in the Supreme Court authorities interpreting those
provisions supported the validity of the misappropriation theory. In arriving at this
conclusion, the Bryan court stated that § 10(b) "prohibits only the use of
deception, in the form of material misrepresentations or omissions, to induce
action or inaction by purchasers or sellers of securities, or that affects others with a
vested interest in a securities transaction."2
67
The Bryan court went on to discuss and distinguish the misappropriation
theory stating that if followed it would even create liability for mere breaches of
fiduciary duty or similar relationships of trust and confidence. Such liability would
attach "whether or not the breaches entail deception within the meaning of section
10(b) and whether or not the parties wronged by the breaches were purchasers or
sellers of securities, or otherwise connected with or interested in the purchase or
sale of securities." 268 This was unacceptable to the court, which held that it still
required other components when establishing criminal liability under § 10(b) and
Rule 10b-5.269
263. 58 F.3d 933 (4th Cir. 1995).
264. 92 F.3d 612 (8th Cir. 1996).
265. See United States v. Bryan, 58 F.3d 933, 945-49 (4th Cir. 1995). Elton
"Butch" Bryan was a director of the West Virginia lottery. In September of 1993, a federal
jury in Charleston, West Virginia, found him guilty of securities fraud in violation of Rule
lOb-5. The counts included perjury as well as mail and wire fraud.
266. The convictions arose from Bryan's manipulation of two government
contracts and from his use of confidential, nonpublic information in the purchase of
securities of companies doing business with the West Virginia lottery. Id. at 936.
267. Id. at 944.
268. Id.
269. The court stated that under the misappropriation theory, criminal liability is
established when a person "(1) misappropriates material nonpublic information (2) by
breaching a duty arising out of a relationship of trust and confidence and (3) uses that
information in a securities transaction, (4) regardless of whether he owed any duties to the
shareholders of the traded stock." Id.
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The flaw in the theory, it concluded, is that it attempts to extend liability
by allowing the "fraud" requirement of Rule lOb-5 to be satisfied by the
misappropriation of nonpublic, material information in the breach of a fiduciary
duty or similar relationship. Erroneously, the source of the misappropriated
information need not be a buyer or seller of securities nor have any other interest
in the sale or purchase of securities. The theory has been characterized as "fraud
on the source" liability. As such, the misappropriation theory relies on the fraud
against, and breach of duty toward, any person that is in any way related to a
securities transaction;" an insufficient doctrine as far as the Bryan court was
concerned.27
Relying upon the Supreme Court's statement in Central Banlk2 that the
securities market "demands certainty and predictability," it criticized the
misappropriation theory as injecting substantial uncertainty, writing that "although
fifteen years have passed since the theory's inception, no court adopting the
misappropriation theory has offered a principled basis for distinguishing which
types of fiduciary or similar relationship of trust and confidence can give rise to
Rule lOb-5 liability and which cannot."' 73
In addition, the court emphasized that.the primary concern of § 10(b) was
the protection of purchasers and sellers of securities, referring to Justice
Rehnquist's warning in Blue Chip Stamps, that
[w]e believe that the concern expressed for the danger of vexatious
litigation which could result from a widely expanded class of
plaintiffs under Rule lOb-5 is founded in something more
substantial than the common complaint of many defendants who
would prefer avoiding lawsuits entirely to either settling or tryingthem.Y27
The Bryan court was essentially concerned with speculative damages
from plaintiffs who could allege that they "would have" sold (or bought) shares
had they known of the material, nonpublic information.
270. Id.
271. The court went on to analyze the meaning of "manipulation," "deception,"
and "fraud," as basic requirements for § 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 liability. Holding that the
fraud which Rule lOb-5 prohibits cannot be greater than that which § 10(b) proscribes, the
Fourth Circuit looked to Santa Fe Industries, Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 476 (1977),
where the Supreme Court described "manipulation" as a term referring to "practices, such
as wash sales, matched orders, and rigged prices, that are intended to mislead investors by
artificially affecting market activity." See Bryan, 58 F.3d at 945. Such events did not occur
in Bryan. The court analyzed the meaning of "deception" by referring to the Supreme
Court's decision in Central Bank. See Central Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of
Denver, 511 U.S. 164, 177 (1994), where it limited that term to the "making of a material
mistatement (or omission) or the commission of a manipulative act." See Bryan, 58 F.3d at
946.
272. See Central Bank, 511 U.S. at 188.
273. Bryan, 58 F.3d at 951.
274. Id. at 952.
275. Id.
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In the year following Bryan, the Eighth Circuit also rejected the
misappropriation theory in United States v. O'Hagan.276 James O'Hagan was a
partner in the law firm of Dorsey & Whitney in Minneapolis, Minnesota. In July of
1988, Grand Metropolitan PLC ("Grand Met"), a company based in London,
England, retained Dorsey & Whitney as local counsel to represent Grand Met
regarding a potential tender offer for the common stock of the Pillsbury Company,
headquartered in Minneapolis. O'Hagan did not do any work on the representation
of Grand Met.2' However, he had a major problem-he had embezzled almost
$1,000,000 from a client's trust account.7 8
On August 18, 1988, while Dorsey & Whitney was still representing
Grand Met, O'Hagan began purchasing call options for Pillsbury stock. Each
option gave him the right to purchase one hundred shares of Pillsbury stock by a
specified date, September 9, 1988. Later in August and September, O'Hagan made
similar purchases making him the single largest individual Pillsbury investor.
When Grand Met finally announced its tender offer in October, the price of
Pillsbury stock rose nearly sixty dollars per share, earning O'Hagan a profit of
more than $4.3 million upon the sale of his stock.
The SEC initiated an investigation into O'Hagan's transactions,
culminating in a fifty-seven-count indictment, alleging in relevant part that
O'Hagan defrauded his law firm and its client, Grand Met, by misappropriating
and using for his own trading purposes material, nonpublic information regarding
Grand Met's tender offer. A jury convicted O'Hagan on all counts, and he was
sentenced to a forty-one-month prison term.
Once again reflecting the split among judges in this field, it was a divided
panel of the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit that reversed all of O'Hagan's
convictions. Liability under Rule 10b-5, the court held, "may not be grounded on
the 'misappropriation theory' of securities fraud on which the prosecution
relied."279
Following the rationale of Central Bank and Bryan, the Eighth Circuit
ruled that liability under § 10(b) could not properly be based upon the
misappropriation theory, because the theory "renders nugatory the requirement that
the 'deception' [required under § 10(b)] be 'in connection with the purchase or
sale of any security.' 21' The court held that "only a breach of a duty to parties to
276. United States v. O'Hagan, 92 F.3d 612 (1996), cert. granted, 117 S. Ct. 759
(1997).
277. Several months later, Dorsey & Whitney withdrew from representing Grand
Met. Less than a month later, Grand Met publicly announced its tender offer for Pillsbury
stock.
278. To cover the shortage, he defrauded other clients of the firm (for example,
Mayo Brothers Medical Center was told by O'Hagan that he had settled a case for
$250,000, in which he represented Mayo's as a defendant in a malpractice action, whereas
the settlement was for only $25,000. O'Hagan kept the $225,000 but still was in the red for
covering the rest of his initial theft).
279. O'Hagan, 92 F.3d at 617.
280. Id. at 618.
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the securities transactions or, at the most, to other market participants such as
investors," was sufficient to give rise to § 10(b) liability.281
In short, the court reasoned that there was no "deception," and even if
there were, such conduct did not occur "in connection with" a stock trade.8 2 Once
more, as it could have done with Chiarella seventeen years earlier or Carpenter a
decade past, the Supreme Court had its third opportunity to resolve the issue. This
time it did not disappoint.
VII. THE SUPREME COURT FINALLY RULES ON THE
MISAPPROPRIATION THEORY
In early 1997, the Supreme Court agreed to review the O'Hagan decision.
Popular sentiment expected the Eighth Circuit to be affirmed, with Justices
Rehnquist, Scalia, and Thomas likely to be joined by Justice O'Connor, based on
her dissent in Basic Inc. v. Levinson, and by Justice Kennedy having written his
recent Central Bank opinion.283 On appeal to the High Court,2" the government
argued that the misappropriation theory satisfied § 10(b)'s requirement of
deception, because the act of converting the information to one's own benefit and
by trading "on basis of," deceives the legitimate possessor.
O'Hagan countered by stating that the theory ignores a fundamental
principle of regulatory power that "an administrative agency's interpretation of a
statute under which it is given rule-making authority, is limited by the language of
the statute itself.' '25 He also argued that the question of whether the
281. The Eighth Circuit also reversed O'Hagan's conviction under Rule 14e-3(a)
designed to prohibit trading on the basis of material, nonpublic information concerning a
pending tender offer. The rule creates an obligation to disclose the information or refrain
from trading, regardless of whether the information was obtained through a breach of a
fiduciary duty.
Once again, applying the methodology set out by the Supreme Court in Central
Bank, and focusing on the text of 14e-3, the Eighth Circuit held that the SEC had
overstepped its rulemaking authority when it promulgated Rule 14e-3(a) by failing to
require that a breach of a fiduciary duty be shown, because the term fraud under Section
14(e) requires such a breach. Id. at 613.
282. This holding in O'Hagan conflicted with the decisions from the Second,
Seventh, and Tenth Circuits, each of which had rejected the argument that the SEC
exceeded its authority when it promulgated Rule 14e-3 without the requirement of a breach
of a fiduciary duty. Id.
283. See, e.g., Marcy G. Dworkin, The Misappropriation Theory as a Corollary to
the Classic Insider Trading Theory, 1996 ANN. SuRv. AM. L. 315, 337 (1996); Hall, supra
note 5; Phillips & Zutz, supra note 189; Carol B. Swanson, Reinventing Insider Trading:
The Supreme Court Misappropriates the Misappropriation Theory, 32 WAKE FOREST L.
REv. 1157, 1172 (1987); Michael J. Chmiel, Note, The Insider Trading and Securities
Fraud Enforcement Act of 1988: Codifying a Private Right of Action, 1990 U. ILL. L. REV.
645 (1990).
284. O'Hagan, 117 S. Ct. at 2199.
285. Brief for Respondent James Herman O'Hagan at 8, United States v.
O'Hagan, 117 S. Ct. 2199 (1997) (No. 98-842).
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misappropriation theory is necessary to combat securities fraud is a question for
Congress and not the courts.286
Justice Ginsburg, writing for the majority,287 said that the
misappropriation theory is a valid extension of § 10(b) of the Securities and
Exchange Act of 1934 because it attacks the misuse of confidential information in
breach of a fiduciary duty to its source. The majority rejected the argument of
O'Hagan and the Eighth Circuit, observing that they "misunderstood" its
requirements.288 The majority also concluded that the Eighth Circuit wrongly
rejected the theory when it said that it lacked the elements of fiduciary duty,
deception, and misuse of information in connection with the sale or purchase of
securities.289
On the contrary, the new Supreme Court majority found that
misappropriation does constitute deception, because it involves a breach of duty
owed to the source of the information rather than to the persons with whom the
defendant trades.2 ° In short, deceptive conduct occurs because the actor pretends
loyalty to the principal, while secretly converting the principal's information for
personal gain, thus duping or defrauding that principal. Deception through
nondisclosure is central to the misappropriation theory, because if the defendant
informs the source that he planned to trade on it, the scheme would be foiled from
the outset. A person who learns inside information and secretly uses it to gain no
risk profits has both deceived the source of the information and simultaneously
harmed the investing public. 291' Further, the § 10(b) requirement of "in connection
with the purchase or sale of a security" also is satisfied by the misappropriation
theory, because the defendant's fraud is consummated not when he obtains the
confidential information but when it is used for personal gain. 2
In one of the most unusual "clarifications" of the law by the Court, the
majority stated that if the person making the otherwise illegal trade first discloses
to the one to whom he owes the "duty" that he is trading based upon the nonpublic
information, he would not violate Rule 10b-5.2 3
Does this really mean that if Winans, in the U.S. v. Carpenter294 case, or
even Vincent Chiarella, in his print shop, had told his employer what he was
planning to do and the employer acquiesced, that the statute would be
circumvented? Of course, other liability on the employee and employer may then
exist, but is that type of reasoning consistent with Congress's criteria under this
286. O'Hagan, 117 S. Ct. at 2206-07.
287. Justice Ginsburg was joined in the majority with Justices Stevens, O'Connor,
Kennedy, Souter and Breyer. Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia and Thomas
dissented from parts of the ruling. Id. at 2199.
288. Id. at 2210.
289. Id. at 2211.
290. Id.
291. Id. at 2209.
292. Id.
293. Id. at 2201.
294. Carpenter v. United States, 484 U.S. 19 (1987).
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law? Doubtful certainly, but not surprising in view of the lack of definition and
guidance from Capitol Hill in this field for over sixty years.
The SEC, of course, has long taken the position that the mere possession
of misappropriated material, nondisclosed information violates the Securities
Act.295 It is not quite clear if the court was rejecting that position by requiring an
actual trade based upon that information. If the SEC reads the holding that way, it
undoubtedly will seek to find another highly egregious set of facts, such as
O'Hagan, to clarify this key point. Citing the Carpenter case, the majority
declared:
A company's confidential information... qualifies as property to
which the company has a right of exclusive use... 296 [Further] the
undisclosed misappropriation of such information, in violation of a
fiduciary duty.. .constitutes fraud akin to embezzlement---"'the
fraudulent appropriation to one's own use of the money or goods
entrusted to one's care by another.-'
297
The court concluded its opinion by stating,
Vital to our decision that criminal liability may be sustained under
the misappropriation theory, we emphasize, are two sturdy
safeguards Congress has provided regarding scienter. To establish a
criminal violation of Rule lOb-5, the Government must prove that a
person "willfully" violated the provision. Furthermore, a defendant
may not be imprisoned for violating Rule lOb-5 if he proves that he
had no knowledge of the nule.
298
This rather startling statement could at first glance be read to mean that ignorance
of the law is an excuse. However, the outrageous facts of O'Hagan precluded a
thorough explanation of this position.
Moreover, wilfulness is still defined as knowing conduct.299 Does this
eliminate recklessness as a theory of liability? That would be an enormous pro-
defense result in the middle of the largest SEC victory in history in a Supreme
Court decided insider trading case. More likely, this at least opens up a major area
for further litigation-the same uncertain problem that has plagued the amorphous
§ 10(b) for decades. Regrettably, the political philosophy of the judges and their
attitude toward judicial activism will determine the outcome once again and so the
circle continues unchecked without clear congressional language.
Returning to the equal access theory presented in Cady, Roberts3" and
Texas Gulf Sulphur,30' the Court stated that
295. In re Cady, Roberts Co., 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961).
296. See O'Hagan, 117 S. Ct. at 2208.
297. Id.
298. Id. at 2214 (footnote omitted).
299. Id.
300. In re Cady, Roberts Co., 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961).
301. SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968).
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the misappropriation theory is tuned to an animating purpose of the
Exchange Act: to ensure honest markets, thereby promoting investor
confidence.
Although informational disparity is inevitable in the
securities markets, investors likely would hesitate to venture their
capital in a market where trading based on misappropriated
nonpublic information is unchecked by law.3 2
In response to O'Hagan's final argument that the misappropriation theory
and § 14(e) were an overextension of the power Congress gave to the SEC to
regulate the markets, the majority stated that the recent cases cited by O'Hagan
and the Eighth Circuit to support their position were meant to limit the use of
securities laws in private civil litigation, as opposed to criminal prosecutions.
303
Thus, the elements of scienter and materiality are still essential in some contexts.
However, uncertainty still exists due to the majority's view that the
defender must trade "on the basis" of the misappropriation information. For
example, what if the trader contends that while he knew of the subject information,
he was compelled to sell to raise cash for his spouse's critical cancer surgery? Is
this now a question to be resolved at trial and, if so, by whom-the finder of fact
(if a jury is used) or the judge?
Coincidentally, the Second Circuit has indicated that once someone
possesses such knowledge it cannot be disaggregated from the defendant's
thinking process. 304 Thus, merely trading while knowing of the information, is
sufficient for culpability even if the primary motivation is his spouse's medical
treatment. The Supreme Court, however, has not yet resolved this issue.
VIII. THE FUTURE OF INSIDER TRADING REGULATION
A. Application of the O'Hagan Ruling to the Fact Patterns of Prior Cases
Justice Ginsburg did not try to define the outer limits of the government's
power. She confined her opinion to persons who have some "duty of
confidentiality" against using secret information. 5 This prompted SEC
Enforcement Chief William McLucas to state, "'Although [the] decision confirms
regulators' existing view of insider trading,' it does not expand the playing
field. 306
On the contrary, one could argue that it clearly does so. Before this
decision was handed down, the misappropriation theory was limited in scope to ad
302. O'Hagan, 117 S. Ct. at 2210.
303. Id. at 2216-17.
304. SEC v. Mayhew, 121 F.3d 44 (2d Cir. 1997).
305. See O'Hagan, 117 S. Ct. at 2219.
306. David G. Savage & Thomas S. Mulligan, Court Ruling Backs SEC Even
"Outsiders" Liable for Profiting from Tips, L.A. TIMES, June 26, 1997, at Dl (citation
omitted).
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hoc, lower court cases. Previously, it was never fully recognized by the United
States Supreme Court and, therefore, was not a complete option for prosecutors.
This new viable option, by definition, is an expansion of the rule and encompasses
a broader spectrum of potential violators. In addition, it gives prosecutors the
ammunition to convict abusers of the system who were not convictable in the past
due to the lack of recognition of this theory.
Specifically, if the previously discussed decisions were being considered
today, many of their outcomes would likely have been different; but that alone
does not overrule them. In those decisions, the misappropriation theory was barely
touched upon and not directly addressed in any of the majority opinions. However,
if similar cases arise in the future, the results should be very different from their
predecessors.
To illustrate, in Chiarella,3" the printer who learned nonpublic material
information while on his job and traded upon it was not guilty because of faulty
jury instructions. These instructions were the focus of the decision, not the
misappropriation theory, the latter being discussed only in a strong dissent. 0 8
Looking at the facts today, we could expect the opposite result. Chiarella
misappropriated information with which he was entrusted by his company. In
O'Hagan, Justice Ginsburg applied her opinion to persons who have some "duty
of confidentiality" against using secret information.3" Under this rationale,
Chiarella may not have had a duty toward the specific companies whose
information he used, but he did have a duty to his own company. These facts
would parallel those in Carpenter, giving Chiarella a "fiduciary relationship" with
his employer. Therefore, he would have misappropriated material nonpublic
information that was obtained in the course of employment.
Similarly, in Dirks,310 the defendant was investigating alleged fraudulent
conduct by a corporation. During that effort, Dirks openly discussed the
information he obtained with a number of clients and investors who acted upon
this information. In 1987, Dirks was not convicted of violating Rule 10b-5 because
there was no basis to reach him as a "tipper," because he did not benefit from the
disclosure of the insider information. If this case were tried today, Dirks probably
would be convicted of violating Rule 10b-5 via the misappropriation theory
because it now reaches tippers who do not benefit from disclosure. The secret use
of material "deceives the source of the information and nonpublic information
simultaneously harms members of the investing public. '31
B. Criticism of the Court's Rationale
The misappropriation theory has been criticized in large part for the
confusion of its application. As stated by the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals in
307. Chiarela v. United States, 445 U.S. 222 (1980).
308. Id.
309. See O'Hagan, 117 S. Ct. at 2219.
310. Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646 (1983).
311. O'Hagan, 117 S. Ct. at 2209.
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United States v. Bryan,312 "[i]t would be difficult to overstate the uncertainty that
has been introduced into the already uncertain law governing fraudulent securities
transactions through adoption of the misappropriation theory, with its linchpin the
breach of a fiduciary duty.' 313 The court went further to say that "although fifteen
years have passed since the theory's inception, no court adopting the
misappropriation theory has offered a principled basis for distinguishing which
types of fiduciary or similar relationships of trust and confidence can give rise to
Rule lOb-5 liability and which cannot.' 314
While it is true that other theories of insider trading liability, such as the
traditional fraud based rationale, fail to prohibit all instances of unfair
informational advantage in securities markets, the misappropriation theory also has
many shortcomings. One of the most important criticisms is that it does not fit
within the antifraud provision of Rule lOb-5.31 5 It provides an improper extension
of the proper scope of § 10(b), because it ultimately seeks to create an ill-defined
"parity of information" rationale which has been previously rejected by the
Supreme Court.1 6
Under the misappropriation theory, Rule lOb-5 is violated whenever a
person (1) "steals" material, nonpublic information (2) via a breach of duty arising
from a trusting or confidential relationship and (3) thereafter, transacts upon the
information regardless of whether he owed any duty to shareholders of the
company in whose stock he trades.317
However, the misappropriation theory does not meet the two-part test
extracted from § 10(b)'s language. Section 10(b)'s wording specifically prohibits
"manipulative" and "deceptive devices" employed "in connection with" the
purchase or sale of any "security." The misappropriation theory loosely interprets
§ 10(b)'s "deception" and "in connection with" requirements by severing the link
between the fraud (breach of duty) and the securities trade at issue. The theory
brings within its scope parties who have no connection with issuers or their
shareholders and is premised upon breaches of duty that have nothing to do with
securities markets.
It can be argued that O'Hagan does not definitively resolve this question
of to whom a duty is owed. If the test is whether the one from whom the
information is misappropriated has an expectation that it will be kept confidential,
when is it shared? Distinct possibilities could arise in which the communicator
does not even have an opinion on that subject, (for example, idle gossip by a
312. 58 F.3d 933 (4th Cir. 1995).
313. Id. at 951.
314. Id.
315. See Report of The Task Force on Regulation of Insider Trading, Part 1:
Regulation Under the Antifraud Provisions of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 41 Bus.
LAW. 223, 230-32 (1985); Jill E. Fisch, Start Making Sense: An Analysis and Proposal for
Insider Trading Regulation, 26 GA. L. REv. 179, 200 (1991); Roberta S. Karmel, Attacks on
the Misappropriation Theory, N.Y. L.J. (1996).
316. See Brodsky, supra note 170, at 109.
317. See United States v. O'Hagan, 117 S. Ct. 2199,2207 (1997).
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careless Senior VP of nondisclosed, material information while at her
hairdressers-or to a bartender).
In such an example, the Senior VP probably would assume that her
listener had no idea where she works aid would not have money to invest anyway.
Even if the bartender had available funds to buy the shares, the Senior VP likely
would figure that he would not be sophisticated enough to interpret and act upon
the information.
While the SEC might allege that the Senior VP is a tipper seeking to aid
and abet her friendly bartender, that is not the factual pattern described. Nor has
the Senior VP misappropriated the secret information if she learned it properly
during the course of her officer-level duties. The misappropriation theory should
not be applied to either person in this example because its definition, however
strained already, does not encompass this hypothetical conduct.
It is only when an insider trades on material nonpublic information
without disclosing it that she violates Rule 10b-5 because it is fraudulent to keep
silent when there is a duty to disclose." 8 However, the employee's duty to the
employer under the misappropriation theory has nothing to do with disclosure.
Rather it is a duty to not use for personal gain the confidential information
received in the course of employment.
319
The SEC's view of O'Hagan's interpretation of the misappropriation
theory also would disallow the use of information in securities transactions
obtained through familial and social relationships. Under its position, these
relationships themselves create. a duty to refrain from trading, although there is no
relationship between the breach of duty and the securities transaction. Judicial
extension of insider trading to a breach of duty not related to officers or directors
has made Rule lOb-5 less predictable. As a result, market participants such as the
bartender or hairdresser are given inadequate guidance regarding when it is proper
to buy or sell securities, especially when they might not even know it is nonpublic
information and it was acquired through a source unrelated to the eventual trade.
Moreover, to the extent that the pro-prosecutorial language of the
majority can be read as encouraging the SEC to fashion new theories of criminal
culpability without federal legislation, the court raises procedural and substantive
due process questions as well as issues of fair notice of criminal sanctions.
In short, virtually every word within § 10(b) and Rule lob-5 demands a
definition which should meet the strictest scrutiny of the Supreme Court. Although
the decision in O'Hagan accepted misappropriation within the parameters of
§ 10(b) and Rule 10b-5,32 it will remain unconvincing to many.
318. See, e.g., Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222 (1980).
319. Phillips & Zutz, supra note 189, at 91.
320. See O'Hagan, 117 S. Ct. at 2209-10.
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IX. THE SEC'S VIEW OF ITS ROLE
A. Generally
Long taking an aggressive posture to expand the scope of liability and
guilt, the SEC has characterized its authority as being to enforce the federal
securities laws in a broad and flexible manner.32' Unlike many other federal
agencies, the SEC has been given broad authority to bring its own civil actions in
federal district court and to institute administrative proceedings in which an
administrative law judge may impose sanctions.2 In matters brought in federal
court, the SEC may obtain injunctive orders that prohibit future violations of the
federal securities laws, seek temporary restraining orders ex parte and preliminary
injunctions. Courts can order the payment of civil penalties in SEC actions3  and
require defendants to return their illegal profits. Similarly, the Securities
Enforcement Remedies and Penny Stock Reform Act of 1990324 gives the SEC the
power to institute administrative proceedings to obtain cease and desist orders
against any person violating or causing violations of the federal securities laws and
require the disgorgement of illegal gains.
Frequently, violations of the federal securities laws are prosecuted as
criminal offenses3" because the SEC is authorized to refer matters to the
Department of Justice for such action.326 The SEC also views its role as including
the bringing of fraud actions against securities laws violators anywhere in the
United States regardless of their state or county of residence. Courts have found
subject matter jurisdiction where there is either "conduct or effects" in the United
States relating to a foreign violation of the U.S. securities laws.327 Courts also have
321. See, e.g., § 21(d)(1) of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78u(d)(1) (1994).
322. Id.
323. The SEC first obtained significant authority to seek civil penalties in its
insider trading cases, pursuant to the Insider Trading Sanctions Act of 1984 ("ITSA") and
the ITSFEA, provisions that are codified in § 21A of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78u-1
(1994). The Securities Enforcement Remedies and Penny Stock Reform Act of 1990
("Remedies Act") expanded this authority by providing penalties for any violations of the
federal securities laws other than insider trading covered by ITSA and ITSFEA. The civil
penalty provisions are codified in various sections of the statutes administered by the SEC,
including § 21(d)(3) of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78u(d)(3) (1994). The statutory civil
penalties, as adjusted for inflations, are set out in Table I to Rule 1001 of the Commission's
Rules of Practice, 17 C.F.R. § 201.1001 (1998).
324. See, e.g., § 21C of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78u-3 (1994).
325. See, e.g., § 32 of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78ff (1994). Under the
Exchange Act, individuals who willfully violate the statute may be fined up to $1,000,000
and may be imprisoned for up to ten years. Corporations and entities other than individuals
are subject to fines of up to $2,500,000.
326. See, e.g., § 21(d)(1) of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78u(d)(1) (1994)
('Ihe Commission may transmit such evidence as may be available concerning such acts or
practices as may constitute a violation of any provision of this chapter or the rules or
regulations thereunder to the Attorney General, who may, in his discretion, institute the
necessary criminal proceedings under this chapter.").
327. Itoba Ltd. v. LEP Group PLC, 54 F.3d 118 (2d Cir. 1995); Bersch v. Drexel
Firestone, Inc., 519 F.2d 974 (2d Cir. 1975); Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp. v.
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asserted personal jurisdiction over nonresident defendants in securities fraud
cases.32 Moreover, to the SEC, the basic anti-fraud provision, §10(b), 29 should
reach virtually any fraud related to transactions in securities and not be limited to
situations involving any particular technology related to the issuer whose shares
are traded. With that strong orientation by the SEC, and no congressional
guidance, the courts have been forced to integrate two fundamental fraud
principles.
B. Specifically-The Continued, Troubling Concerns of Scienter and "In
Connection With"
Two striking examples of the SEC's new aggression are demonstrated by
its amicus participation in private suits under the Reform Act now pending federal
appellate resolution.
1. Scienter Under the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act330
In re Silicon Graphics, Inc. Securities Litigation33 is a class action under
§ 10b and Rule lOb-5 filed on behalf of purchasers of shares of Silicon Graphics,
Inc, during which, it was alleged, the price of the shares was artificially inflated
because of the defendant corporation's false and misleading statements about its
current business and future prospects.
The District Court initially granted a defense motion to dismiss the
original complaint, largely on the grounds that it did not meet the new higher
requirements of what it believed the Reform Act required for pleading scienter.
The court held that the plaintiff must allege specific facts that constitute
circumstantial evidence of conscious behavior by defendants. 32 With respect to
Maxwell, 468 F.2d 1326 (2d Cir. 1972); Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, 405 F.2d 200 (2d Cir.
1968), rev'd on other grounds, 405 F.2d 215 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc).
328. See, e.g., SEC v. Carillo, 115 F.3d 1540 (11th Cir. 1997). See generally
International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945) (quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311
U.S. 437 (1940)).
329. Together with § 17a of the Securities Act of 1933.
330. The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67,
109 Stat. 737, 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4 (Supp. 1996).
331. 970 F. Supp. 746 (N.D. Cal. 1997), appeal pending (9th Cir.). The case has
been split for purposes of appeal to the Ninth Circuit into Janas v. McCracken, Docket #
97-16204, and Brody v. McCracken, Docket # 97-16240. Oral argument in both cases was
held on June 11, 1998, and the appeals are pending.
332. Silicon Graphics, 970 F. Supp. at 766. Specifically, it concluded that:
Based on the foregoing discussion, the Court finds that in order to state a
private securities fraud claim, plaintiffs must create a strong inference of
knowing or intentional misconduct. Knowing or intentional misconduct
includes deliberate recklessness.... Motive, opportunity, and non-
deliberate recklessness may provide some evidence of intentional
wrongdoing, but are not alone sufficient to support scienter unless the
totality of the evidence creates a strong inference of fraud.
Id. at 757 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
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some of the allegations, the court gave leave to the plaintiffs to amend, which
became the subject of a new motion to dismiss.
On the second round, the court interpreted the pleading standards to
require, with particularity, the names of sources of such allegations and the
specific facts told to the plaintiffs by such persons-a new and major burden.333 In
addition to criticizing such heightened tests, plaintiffs' attorneys argued both the
great expense to which they have to go to get past the inevitable motion to dismiss,
but also the risk created by the mandated invitation to others to participate in the
action even to take over the case as lead plaintiff without having done any of the
initial work.'3
The SEC filed an amicus brief in response to this new motion, to focus on
the issue of whether the new pleading standard eliminated recklessness as
satisfying the scienter requirement in private actions under § 10(b) of the
Exchange Act and Rule lOb-5. The Ninth Circuit, when previously considering the
question of the required degree of scienter, had held that recklessness was
sufficient to establish liability under § 10(b) and Rule lOb-5.335 The new pleading
standard should not, in the SEC's view, alter those holdings.
3 6
The SEC argued that § 21D(b)(2) of the Reform Act, by its express terms,
only purports to establish a standard for pleading. It does not in any way address,
much less alter, the substantive elements of a violation. It emphasized that with
respect to the meaning of scienter, in contrast to the method of pleading it, the
language of the section is entirely neutral, referring only to the "required states of
mind., 3 7 In determining that § 21D(b)(2) required the pleading of conscious
behavior, the SEC argued that the court previously had drawn from a purely
procedural provision the incorrect conclusion that Congress had eliminated a well-
established substantive standard.
However, the court thereafter issued a new order granting, in part,
defendant's motion to dismiss the amended complaint. The court reaffirmed its
earlier ruling that the Reform Act required plaintiffs to plead facts giving rise to a
strong inference of knowing misrepresentation by the defendant. 33' This holding,
however, was tempered by the court's statement that a showing of "deliberate
recklessness" would suffice.339 The opinion defined "deliberate recklessness" to
mean conduct which presents such a danger of misleading buyers or sellers that the
defendant either knew or must have been aware of it. Thus, the fact that this
court's pleading test under the Reform Act is tougher than that of the Second
Circuit implies that conscious acts by the defendant may be required. 34" This strict
definition of recklessness was first spelled out by the Seventh Circuit in
333. Id. at 767.
334. Id. at 757.
335. Id. at 754-57.
336. Id. at 753.
337. Id. at 758. Defined in Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 193 n.12
(1976), as "a mental state embracing an intent to deceive, manipulate, or defraud."
338. Silicon Graphics, 970 F. Supp. at 754-57.
339. Id. at 757.
340. Id. at 766-67.
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Sundstrand Corp. v. Sun Chemical Corp."4 Though the plaintiff in Silicon
Graphics has now appealed to the Ninth Circuit, the holding already has been
followed.4 2
Zeid v. Kimberley,' which holds to the contrary, also is on appeal to that
Circuit. These are the first cases submitted to a U.S. Court of Appeals which raise
the question of the proper standard of pleading scienter under the Reform Act,3"
an area of substantial uncertainty in an already confusing field.
2. The "In Connection With" Requirement Under the Reform Act
a. Levitin v. PaineWebber, Inc.,"s and Bissell v. Merrill Lynch & Co.,
Inc.3
46
In these two cases, plaintiffs were customers who alleged that broker-
dealers failed .to disclose that they were earning interest on collateral put up by
customers to secure margin accounts. The district court dismissed the plaintiffs'
complaints, holding that the alleged omission did not satisfy the "in connection
with" requirement of § 10(b) because it did not pertain to a security or to the
consideration for a security.
The SEC filed an amicus brief making two arguments: (1) that under
Second Circuit precedent 47 the "in connection with" requirement is satisfied when
a broker-dealer makes a misrepresentation or omission with a reasonable
expectation that it could influence a customer's securities trading, regardless of
whether the deception pertains to a security,348 and (2) that in any event the
requirement is satisfied when a broker-dealer makes a misrepresentation or
omission that relates to a customer's brokerage account. 349 While both cases were
affirmed, a high court ruling is needed to finalize the matter.
341. 553 F.2d 1033 (7th Cir. 1977).
342. See Marksman Partners, L.P. v. Chantal Pharm. Corp., 927 F. Supp. 1297
(C.D. Cal. 1996).
343. 930 F. Supp. 431 (N.D. Cal. 1996).
344. Id.
345. 933 F. Supp. 325 (S.D.N.Y. 1996). It is interesting to note that the SEC has
filed an anicus brief even in civil actions brought by private litigants if it fears a judicial
ruling which could affect its pleading standards in the SEC's own cases. This case has been
affirmed. No. 96-7994, 1998 WL 665039 (2d Cir. Sept. 29, 1998).
346. 937 F. Supp. 237 (S.D.N.Y. 1996), aff'd, 157 F.3d 138 (2d Cir. 1998).
347. A.T. Brod & Co. v. Perlow, 375 F.2d 393 (2d Cir. 1967).
348. Brief of the Securities and Exchange Commission, Amicus Curiae at 5-13,
Bissell v. Merrill Lynch & Co., Inc., 157 F.3d 138 (2d Cir. 1998) (No. 96-9137).
349. Id. at 13-14. See also Levitin v. Pain Webber, Inc., 933 F. Supp. 325, 329-
30 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
ARIZONA LAW REVIEW
b. McGann v. Ernst & Young
In McGann v. Ernst & Young350 , the SEC once more filed an amicus
curiae brief arguing that the district court erred in holding that the test for the "in
connection with" requirement of § 10(b) of the Exchange Act set forth in SEC v.
Texas Gulf Sulphur Co.,351 had been implicitly overruled by the Supreme Court's
1994 decision in Central Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver.352 It
argued that the Texas Gulf test is correct. The district court held that only
statements in offering documents (as distinguished from periodic reports, such as
the Form 10-K involved in this case) meet the "in connection with" requirement.
The SEC's brief argued that this construction of § 10(b), if accepted, would
seriously impair its ability to bring enforcement actions to eradicate fraud and its
attendant harm to the marketplace. 53
The district court granted the defendant's motion for judgment on the
pleadings, stating that the Supreme Court's decision in Central Bank requires that
"the scope of prohibited conduct under § 10(b) must be determined by looking at
the text of the statute and to the language of the express liability provisions of the
1934 Act. '35 4 The court then concluded, without any further analysis, that "[w]hat
Ernst did cannot be converted into making a false statement or committing a
manipulative act 'in connection with' the sale or purchase of securities."3 55
Contrariwise, the SEC's amicus brief argued that the district court
incorrectly rejected the long-standing principle that where a person makes a
fraudulent statement with the reasonable expectation that it will be disseminated to
the securities markets, he satisfies § 10(b)'s requirement that the fraud be "in
connection with" the purchase or sale of securities as first enunciated in SEC v.
Texas Gulf Sulphur Co. 356 However, the district court viewed Texas Gulf as a
"policy-based" decision, and held that it, and its successors, could be disregarded
350. 95 F.3d 821 (9th Cir. 1996), amended and superceded by 102 F.3d 390 (9th
Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 1460 (1997). The plaintiffs in this class action were
purchasers of common stock of Community Psychiatric Centers ("CPC"), a New York
Stock Exchange listed company. Defendant Ernst & Young, LLP ("Ernst") was CPC's
outside auditor. The complaint alleged that Ernst knowingly or recklessly issued a
materially false and misleading opinion letter that it knew would appear in CPC's financial
statements contained in a Form 10-K filed with the SEC. According to the complaint, the
plaintiffs would not have purchased CPC stock at the prices they paid, or bought at all, if
they had been aware that the market prices had been falsely inflated by Ernst's misleading
statements. Such an allegation as "or bought at all" raises the enormous problem of
hypothetical transactions that would or would not have taken place but for the defendants'
fraud.
351. 401 F.2d 833, 860 (2d Cir. 1968).
352. 511 U.S. 164 (1994).
353. McGann v. Ernst & Young, No. SA CV93-814AHS, 1995 WL 852119 at *7
(C.D. Cal. May 30, 1995).
354. Id.
355. Id.
356. 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968).
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because they are inconsistent with Central Bank's rejection of policy-based
statutory construction. 57
The Court of Appeals thereafter reversed the district court, agreeing with
all of the arguments advanced by the SEC and rejecting the district court's
conclusion that Texas Gulf and its progeny were in effect overruled by Central
Bank. The court stated that "reports of Texas Gulf's demise are greatly
exaggerated," '358 and that there is "no tension between the holding of Central Bank
and the holding of Texas Guf."359 Rather, the court explained in detail that the
Texas Gulf test is fully consistent with the text and structure of § 10(b).36
The court also found that, even after Central Bank, it is proper for a court
to look to policy considerations in construing § 10(b). 361' Noting that Congress had
"broad remedial goals"362 when it enacted the securities laws, it found that these
goals are best served by interpreting § 10(b) to impose liability on "all whose false
assertions are reasonably calculated to influence the investing public., 363 Thus, the
stage is set for more uncertain controversy, inconsistency and costly litigation,
despite Congress' intention to "reform" securities litigation.
C. Is There Any Role for RICO?
Any discussion of plaintiffs' remedies for securities fraud needs to
address one of the most aggressively and, perhaps, overused newer federal
statutes-the RICO law.3 4 While the initial, primary focus of RICO was directed
toward organized crime, it also creates a private cause of action for "any person
injured in his.. .property by reason of.. .a pattern of racketeering activity." 365
Could RICO possibly provide a route by which a plaintiff could avoid
Rule 10b-5 problems of materiality, causation, standing, scienter, and reliance?
One commentator has suggested that the provisions of RICO should be liberally
construed to achieve its objective, including securities fraud.366 At the time of that
article, almost one third of the civil RICO cases on file were predicated on
securities fraud violations.3 67 One reason may well have been that unlike §§ 10(b)
and 20(A), the civil RICO Act allows for punitive and treble damages as well as
the recovery of attorneys fees, rarely allowed in traditional securities cases.
357. McGann, 1995 WL 852119 at *7.
358. Id. at 825.
359. Id.
360. Id. at 825-28.
361. Id. at 827.
362. Id.
363. Id. at 828.
364. 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 1961-68 (1994 & Supp. 1996).
365. Id. A typical example of racketeering includes "any act which is committed
for financial gain.. .involving.. .theft... or intentional or reckless fraud in the purchase or sale
of securities." See e.g., AiZ. REv. STAT. § 13-2301(D)(4) (1997).
366. Arthur F. Mathews, Shifting the Burden of Losses in the Securities Markets:
The Role of Civil RICO in Securities Litigation, 65 NoTRE DAME L. REv. 896 (1990).
367. Id. at 930.
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Although federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction over all securities
claims under the Securities Exchange Act, including § 20(A), states have
concurrent jurisdiction with federal courts regarding the civil RICO statute. This
overlapping jurisdiction is consistent with the remedial purposes of the Securities
Exchange Act. Since the Supreme Court decision in Tafflin v. Levitt,368 a plaintiff
can now bring a civil RICO case in state court based on a § 10(b) securities fraud
predicate violation, which also could contain a § 20(A) claim. Moreover, the Ninth
Circuit has held that there is no purchase or sale requirement in a civil RICO
securities fraud case.369
However, all of this preceded the O'Hagan case and its revival of the
misappropriation theory. Thus, it seems unlikely that RICO will be needed by
aggrieved plaintiffs, but should the O'Hagan ruling be narrowed in the future, it
remains available as an intriguing and distinct possibility.
X. FUTURE SCENARIOS
A. Possible Defendants
Now that the misappropriation theory has been recognized, is there a limit
to how far it can go? This question will most likely arise in a new debate over the
identity of the parties. In looking at the total playing field, certain participants in
the insider trading practice are easily identifiable as violating Rule 1Ob-5 and
should be considered insiders. A clear illustration is the CFO of a corporation who
trades or tips others based on information acquired as a result of her position. This
situation, in most cases, would not even require the application of the
misappropriation theory, but if necessary it could be so used.
Contrariwise, certain participants are not easily identifiable as insiders via
the misappropriation theory. What if the CFO of a corporation has a secretary who
overhears a conversation outside the office about the possible takeover of her
corporation by another company? Let us assume that this information is overheard
at a conference of secretaries. Is this secretary violating Rule lOb.5 if she trades on
the information? Will the misappropriation theory reach her?
There is a chance that it will, because she is converting information about
a corporation to which she now apparently has a fiduciary duty of nondisclosure.
Arguably, the secretary would be misappropriating nonpublic, material
information to her own use. If the secretary tells her nonincorporated stock club
about the probable takeover, are its members in violation of Rule lOb-5 if the club
itself trades or if they do so individually? Does the misappropriation theory have
them within its grasp or are they outside the scope of the law? If one accepts
"equal access to the market" and "inherent unfairness" to other traders as viable
rationales, they might be within the reach of the misappropriation theory. If one
focuses on fiduciary relationships, a contractual delegation, or a similar "duty" to
the owner or rightful possessor of the information, the club members will most
likely be considered outside the scope of the theory, because they have no
368. 493 U.S. 455 (1989).
369. Securities Inv. Protection Corp. v. Vigman, 908 F.2d 1461 (9th Cir. 1990).
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connection with the corporation whose stock is being traded. Similarly, the identity
of defendants and standards of proof under § 20(a) and the Reform Act raise
serious issues.
First a word about § 20(a) of the 1934 Act.370 The purpose of this
controlling person provision is, according to the general view of the courts, "to
impose secondary liability on one who controls the violator of the securities
laws." 371 From that point, however, there is a confusion among the district and
circuit courts as to the required element of proof. The primary view is that a prima
facie case is established by demonstrating (a) a primary violation by the controlled
person, and (b) control of the primary violator by the targeted defendant.372 After
that point, however, there is considerable debate among lower courts whether the
Reform Act3 73 requires one to plead facts necessary to demonstrate a significant
inference of conscious misbehavior or only recklessness on the part of the
defendant.
374
In SEC v. First Jersey Securities, the plaintiff's prima facie case was
required to include facts showing that "the controlling person was in some
meaningful sense a culpable participant in the fraud perpetrated by the controlled
person. 3 7' Another court has said that the facts the plaintiff needs to assert are
"some indirect means of discipline or influence short of actual direction to call [the
defendant] liable. ' 376
In Hollinger v. Titan Capital Corp.,3' the plaintiff was not required to
show "culpable participation" in order to establish that -a broker dealer was
vicariously liable as the controlling person for the registered representative's
conduct. Instead, liability was based on the controlled relationship, subject to a
good faith defense by the defendant.37
Contrariwise, in Brug v. Enstar Group,379 the court held that to establish a
controlled person liability under the Securities Exchange Act, "the plaintiff must
not only show that the particular person was a control person, but also that he or
she either participated in the fraud or intentionally furthered fraud through
inaction."38 There, the plaintiffs claimed that the president and chairman were
370. 15 U.S.C. § 78t(a) (1994).
371. Borden, Inc. v. Spoor Behrins Campbell & Young, 735 F. Supp. 587, 588
(S.D.N.Y 1990).
372. SEC v. First Jersey Sec., 101 F.3d 1450 (2d Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 118 S.
Ct. 57 (1997).
373. Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (codified as amended in scattered sections
of 15 U.S.C. (Supp. 1996)).
374. See In re Silicon Graphics, Inc. Sec. Litig. 970 F. Supp. 746 (N.D. Cal.
1997); Friedberg v. Discreet Logic, Inc., 959 F. Supp. 42 (D.C. Mass. 1997).
375. See First Jersey Securities, 101 F.3d at 1472, (quoting Lanza v. Drexel Co.
479 F.2d 1277, 1299 (2d Cir. 1973) (en banc)).
376. Harrison v. Dean Witter Reynolds, 974 F.2d 873, 880 (7th Cir. 1992)
(quoting Myzel v. Fields, 386 F.2d 718,738 (8th Cir. 1967)).
377. 914 F.2d 1564 (9th Cir. 1990).
378. Id. at 1574.
379. 755 F. Supp. 1247, 1256 (D. Del. 1991).
380. Id. at 1257 (quoting Rochez Bros., Inc. v. Rhoades, 527 F.2d 889, 890 (3d
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controlling persons, but they did not allege facts sufficient to plead successful
liability because they did not demonstrate "culpable participation or deliberate
inaction of those [two key persons]."3"' Yet, in Borden v. Spoor Behrins Campbell
& Young, 382 another court noted that in order to state a claim, neither scienter nor
culpable participation need be pleaded; all that need be plead is control status.
38 3
Under the Reform Act, it would appear that either the Second Circuit's
Time Warner 4 rule or more will be required to plead, and that "culpable
participation" or "scienter" will need to be demonstrated, not just merely proof of a
controlled relationship, which would transfer the burden over to the defense to
show good faith. Finally, in Paracor Finance v. General Electric,3 5 the Ninth
Circuit said that the plaintiff need not show scienter or culpable participation.
38 6
Once again because of Congress's ambiguity, it has been left to the courts
to interpret these rules. However, a Supreme Court opinion interpreting the 1995
Reform Act as it applies to this section is also needed.
B. Predicting the Supreme Court
Over the years, the philosophy that there is some fundamental
"unfairness" in trading activity exists in the securities markets has prompted the
SEC to give an expansive interpretation of § 10(b) and Rule lOb-5. Yet, the scope
given to § 10(b) to prohibit insider trading remains unclear, and its evolving
interpretation within the federal courts has led to inconsistent case results. Such
inconsistencies continue to occur because Congress has never enacted a statute that
specifically defines a violation of insider trading. Furthermore, the Supreme
Court's decisions have vacillated from one rationale to another'depending upon the
makeup of the court.
The Court's piecemeal approach to insider trading regulation under
§ 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 has now created a violation which is dependent upon case-
by-case analysis. As a result, persons participating in securities markets and their
counsel confront a significant degree of uncertainty when they try to ascertain the
difference between permitted and prohibited activity.
This was especially the situation in the O'Hagan case, in which the
attorney-defendant undoubtedly knew of the Supreme Court's holdings throughout
the 1970s and 1980s. O'Hagan surely believed that he was complying with the
Dirks and Chiarella rationale when he traded on the information he attained
regarding Grand Met's desire to take over Pillsbury. Commentators predicted that
the Supreme Court would follow a strict textually based, statutory construction,
Cir. 1975)).
381. Id.
382. 735 F. Supp. 587 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
383. Id.
384. In re Time Warner, Inc., 9 F.3d 259 (2d Cir. 1993).
385. 96 F.3d 1151 (9th Cir. 1996).
386. Id. at 1161.
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invalidating the "misappropriation theory" as an invalid extension of § 10(b) and
Rule 10b-5. 7
Since it did not do so, the question becomes, will the court continue to
judicially legislate so that a second, third, or even fourth degree tippee (the
permutations are virtually endless), or the classsic eavesdropper be included? For
example, if a Barry Switzer type case388 was presented to the court once again,
would he be found guilty?
The SEC thinks so, and is taking aggressive action to expand the law by
using § 21(A)389 which imposes an antitrust-type penalty of "three times the profit
gained or loss avoided" from insider trading and even a "bounty" to informants.
31
Moreover, it is interesting to note that the so-called "swing votes" of
Justices Kennedy and O'Connor (both President Reagan appointees), who had
previously written opinions strongly criticizing an expansion of § 10(b),391 sided
with the majority. Had they agreed with the strongly worded dissent of Justices
Rehnquist, Scalia, and Thomas, and voted as many anticipated, the decision would
have come out five to four the other way.
The unexpected Supreme Court ruling in O'Hagan further supports the
argument that there is insufficient certainty and predictability in the enforcement
of insider trading laws. The impact of this decision will be significant upon those
trading based upon material information.
With the SEC's aggressive attitude, and six members of the court now
accepting the misappropriation theory, it appears that, effectively, Santa Fe
Industries, Inc. v. Green,392 requiring more than mere unfairness in a securities
transaction, has been put on the shelf. A breach of fiduciary duty is now actionable
387. See Hall, supra note 5. See, e.g., Kenny & Thebaut, supra note 196;
Bainbridge, supra note 196, at 1193.
388. SEC v. Switzer, 590 F. Supp. 756 (W.D. Okla 1984).
389. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-1 (1994).
390. Id. § 78u-l(e).
(e) Authority to award bounties to informants
Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection (d)(1) of this
section, there shall be paid from amounts imposed as a penalty under this
section and recovered by the Commission or the Attorney General, such
sums, not to exceed 10 percent of such amounts, as the Commission
deems appropriate, to the person or persons who provide information
leading to the imposition of such penalty. Any determinations under this
subsection, including whether, to whom, or in what amount to make
payments, shall be in the sole discretion of the Commission, except that
no such payment shall be made to any member, officer, or employee of
any appropriate regulatory agency, the Department of Justice, or a self-
regulatory organization. Any such determination shall be final and not
subject to judicial review.
391. See Justice Kennedy in Central Bank, 505 U.S. 959 (1993), and Justice
O'Connor in her strongly worded dissent with Justice White in Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485
U.S. 224 (1988).
392. 430 U.S. 462 (1977).
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under 10b-5, unless there was an absolute, full disclosure of all relevant facts
before trading.
On that point, the question posed in Basic Inc. v. Levinson 393 by the then
dissenting opinions of Justices White and O'Connor becomes relevant once again:
the concerns involving the extreme problems of releasing information based on the
mere possibility of corporate results (for example, negotiations regarding a
merger). How do companies read O'Hagan in terms of deciding when to release
information which may even be embryonic in nature? Litigation may result no
matter whether it errs on the side of disclosure of even preliminary negotiations,
waits until the agreement is signed ,or chooses a middle ground.
With regard to tippees, O'Hagan seems to have upheld the requirement in
the Dirks case that the government needs to prove a breach of duty on the part of
the tipper before holding a tippee liable. However, any questions regarding the
press releases of material information and their accuracy or omissions must once
again be reviewed by in-house counsel and outside lawyers advising corporations.
In-house counsel will need to establish procedures to verify that corporate officers
and others with access to material information will be limited in number and use
that data with extraordinary care.
Moreover, securities class actions and private individual suits filed since
the enactment of the Reform Act show an increased number of plaintiffs seeking to
tie "contemporaneous" securities class actions to allegations of improper trades by
corporate insiders. In-house counsel has an extreme duty to tighten procedures in
this area.
Likewise, after the O'Hagan decision, the government undoubtedly will
strongly pursue the nondisclosure of information involved in a tender offer under
§14e-3,394 upheld by the Court, particularly when there is a great deal of trading
activity before a press release. While there is a corporate duty to safeguard critical
information, the government's burden of proof will be significantly less after
O'Hagan. Similarly, stockbrokers and their officials will have an even more
extreme duty to preserve confidential information under Rule lOb-5 as well as 14e-
3.
Controversially, the SEC has taken the position that merely possessing
nonpublic information is enough to violate the law. What happens, however, when
a securities firm continues to trade in a security for its customers while that firm's
investment banking division is completing a major transaction that has not yet
been disclosed? Can one part of the brokerage house make the other culpable?
Hopefully, the O'Hagan case seems to say that mere possession is not
enough, and that the test for insider trading liability still is whether or not the
defendant engaged in his transaction on the basis of material nonpublic
information. The court stated,
the fiduciary fraud is consummated.. .when, without disclosure to
his principal, he uses the information to purchase or sell securities.
393. 485 U.S. 224,258-59,261-62 (1988).
394. S.E.C. Rel. No. 34-17120,45 FED. REG. 60410 (1980).
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The self-serving use of a principal's information to purchase or sell
securities is a breach of a duty of loyalty and confidentiality which
defrauds the principal of the exclusive use of that information.
395
Doctrinally, this also would be the time to reexamine the plurality opinion
of Basic Inc. v. Levinson 96 regarding the efficacy of the "fraud on the market"
theory.3 Can there really be an "efficient market" giving "equal access" to all?
Regrettably, the combination of these three events (§ 20(A), the Reform Act, and
O'Hagan) means that the SEC and the judiciary will continue to be able to create
more insider trading law on an ad hoc basis: not the most appropriate manner to
effectuate equal justice.
Furthermore, as the makeup of the Supreme Court changes with time, it is
likely that its decisions regarding insider trading regulation will alter as well. This
leads to a compelling argument that legislation is necessary to finally put to rest
the problems associated with enforcement of these insider trading laws.
XI. CALL FOR ACTION: TWO ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES
A. Congressional Leadership
For over two decades, the United States Supreme Court has been asking
Congress to implement a set of standards for regulating so-called insider trading of
securities. As Justice Rehnquist remarked in Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug
Stores in 1975:398 "it would be disingenuous to suggest that either Congress in
1934 or the Securities and Exchange Commission in 1942, foreordained the
present state of the law with respect to § 10(b)(5)." 3' What has happened since has
exacerbated the problem.
As a starting point, Congress need look no further than the § 10(b)'s sister
provisions, adopted at the same time in the 1934 Act: §§ 16(a) and (b). These
sections provide a clear, straightforward legal scheme to deter insider trading, in
complete contrast to § 10(b), which has none of the following provisions.
First, § 16(a) identifies the defendant: an officer, director, or ten percent
shareholder of any equity security registered pursuant to § 12 of the Securities
Exchange Act.401 Moreover, it applies "irrespective of any intention on the part of
[the trader] ."402 Its definition of damages is likewise clear, applying to "any profit
realized by him from any purchase and sale or sale and purchase...." There is even
a statute of limitations of two years, unlike § 10b, which had none in its original
language.403
395. -United States v. O'Hagan, 117 S. Ct. 2199,2207 (1997).
396. 485 U.S. 224 (1988).
397. Id. at 227.
398. 421 U.S. 723 (1975).
399. Id. at 737.
400. 15 U.S.C. § 78p (1994).
401. Id.
402. Id.
403. Id. A major void in § 10(b) was any mention of a statute of limitations. The
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With §§ 16(a) and (b) cases, there has been no need for such difficult and
inconsistent judicially legislated concepts in § 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 decisions, of
scienter, duty, privity, fraud on the marketplace, reliance, causation, materiality,
misappropriation, tippees, and even eavesdroppers.
Perhaps §§ 16 (a) and (b) are what Congress had in mind all along for the
governance of this area of the law. As Second Circuit Judge Winter stated in
United States v. Chestman,0
The existence of § 16(b) which indicates that Congress expressly
addressed the issue, might well have led the SEC and the courts to
conclude that Congress intended that § 16(b) be the sole provision
governing insider trading. No other provision explicitly addresses
the problem, and § 16(b) eliminates what is perhaps the most
obvious danger inherent in insider trading, namely the creation of an
incentive for directors or officers to make share price volatile in
order to profit from short swing trading. Moreover, one might have
inferred from § 16(b)'s mechanical approach, ignoring purpose and
actual profit, that regulation of insider trading without legislative or
regulatory guidelines" would involve a mare's test of analytic and
definitional problems. °5
Today, Congress could decide to interpret § 10(b) in areas where the
Supreme Court's decisions have been inconsistent. After O'Hagan, this could
actually encourage Congress to legislate the misappropriation theory.
Alternatively, it could create a sweeping reform which would likely find its basis
in the Chiarella'Dirks framework.
Optimistically, its historic failure to overhaul the securities laws and enact
a definition of insider trading to date does not necessarily indicate that Congress is
unwilling to accept either approach. At its disposal are nearly seventy years of
judicial scrutiny of both § 10(b), and Rule lOb-5. However, it seems unrealistic to
expect Congress to act at this point despite calls for such action by Supreme Court
Justices and commentators. As a result, the following alternative is suggested.
federal courts had generally used applicable state law, hardly a predictable approach and
one that led to frequently inconsistent results. In 1991, in Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis &
Petigrow v. Gilbertson, 501 U.S. 350 (1991), a majority of the Supreme Court held that § 18
of the 1934 Act, applied, essentially a one-year period from discovery of the facts and 3
years after the cause of action accrued. In James B. Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia, 501
U.S. 529 (1991), decided concurrently, the Court said that this new interpretation of a
statute of limitations applied retroactively to all parties. Convictions of such infamous
defendants as Ivan Boesky and Michael Milken were set aside.
Congress retaliated again by adopting § 27a, 15 U.S.C. § 78aa-l(b) (1994),
allowing cases which were timely filed in their jurisdiction before the Beam case to be
reinstated. However, the Court had the last word later, declaring the new § 27a law
unconstitutional in Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm Inc., 514 U.S. 211 (1995).
404. 947 F.2d 551, 572 (2d Cir. 1991).
405. ld. at 572-73.
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B. Judicial Restraint on the Identity of the Plaintiff-Problems with Expanding
the Players
1. The Judiciary versus Congress
The Kardon406 case in 1947 established an implied private cause of action,
modified by the Second Circuit's Birnbaum decision in 1952, requiring that the
plaintiff must be a purchaser or seller of securities (or the SEC). Those decisions
were essentially confirmed in Blue Chip Stamp v. Manner Drug Stores °8 in 1975.
Since then, virtually all of the focus has been on the identity of the defendant in
such cases. O'Hagan 9 was just the next incremental step in the line.
The major focus now should be on the identity of the plaintiffs. In 1988,
§ 20(A)410 was adopted, establishing claims by contemporaneous traders against
defendants engaged in insider trading. A five-year statute of limitations applies,
following the last violating trade. Claims also may be brought against those
allegedly in "control" of the violator, presumably entities such as Mr. O'Hagan's
law firm.
411
Serious questions immediately arise about the current definition of
"contemporaneous," particularly if the defendant's conduct extends over several
days or weeks, a typical scenario. Could the plaintiff argue that (a) he would have
bought or sold, or (b) would have not bought or sold, or (c) would have bought or
sold more or less shares, or (d) would not have bought or sold more or less shares
(depending upon the direction of the stock price) had he only known the same
information used by the defendant? What stock price should be used? How would
this Joe Six-Pack prove that precise moment in time when he would have traded?
The actual price of the stock also would be inaccurate because the
defendant's illegal trade volume influenced that price. Should economists be called
by all parties to determine what the "real" price should have been?
Speculative as these damages and price calculations appear to be,
Congress once again has provided no guidelines. Its confusing numbering system
is bad enough; however, § 20(A) of ITSFEA does not even" have a definition of
profits and losses.412 Section 21(A) includes one,413 but are the courts once again to
apply provisions of different sections to others? This uncertainty also will continue
without further clarification from Congress. A closer look at ITSFEA is instructive
for predicting the identity of plaintiffs in the future.
406. Kardon v. National Gypsum, 73 F. Supp. 798 (E.D. Pa. 1947).
407. Bimbaum v. Newport Steel Corp., 193 F.2d 461 (2d Cir. 1952).
408. 421 U.S. 723 (1975).
409. United States v. O'Hagan, 117 S. Ct. 2199 (1997).
410. 15 U.S.C. § 78t-l(a) (1994).
411. Id.
412. Id.
413. 15 U.S.C. 78u-l(f) (1994).
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2. Eligible Plaintiffs: Early Rulings Before § 20(A)
In Laventhall v. General Dynamics Corp.,414 the Eighth Circuit held that a
plaintiff who sold call options did not have standing to sue a defendant who had
bought stock under Rule 10b-5. The court relied primarily on language in
Chiarella,41s holding that Rule 10b-5 required a "special relationship" between a
buyer and a seller.
Other courts did not permit such suits either, referring to the complexity
and uncertainty of proof, particularly in the computation of damages. Among the
cases in which private actions were not permitted against defendants trading on the
basis of inside information is Fridrich v. Bradford,416 where the defendants did not
purchase shares from the plaintiffs and their trading in no way affected the
plaintiffs' decision to sell. However, the court suggested that private civil liability
does not need to be coextensive within the reach of the 1934 Act.
417
In Moss v. Morgan Stanley Inc.,418 and Moss v. Newman,"9 the defendants
were alleged tippees of the so-called "aggressor" in a proposed tender offer who
traded shares in the target company. The courts held that these tippees owed no
duty to the plaintiffs because they traded in an impersonal market.
Contrariwise, in State Teachers Retirement Board v. Fluor Corp.,420 the
defendants were found to have, in fact, purchased shares sold by the plaintiff on
the basis of insider information, resulting in a reversal of a lower court's dismissal
of the complaint.
Cases antedating § 20(A) that permitted private actions required that the
plaintiffs have "traded contemporaneously" with the defendants. In Wilson v.
Comtech Telecommunications Corp.,42' the Second Circuit held that a duty of
disclosure on the part of insiders trading in the open market "is owed only to those
investors trading contemporaneously with the insider; noncontemporaneous traders
do not require the protection of the 'disclose or abstain' rule because they do not
suffer the disadvantage of trading with someone who has superior access to
information."" The court held that the plaintiff's trades, which took place about
one month after the defendant's, were not "contemporaneous. ' 4z
In Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. ,424 the court
held that trading within a four-day period was "contemporaneous," and in
Neubronner v. Milken, a 1993 pre-§ 20(A) transaction, 4' the court dismissed a
414. 704 F.2d 470 (8th Cir. 1983).
415. Chiarella v. U.S., 445 U.S. 222, 229 (1980).
416. 542 F.2d 307 (6th Cir. 1976).
417. Id.
418. 719 F.2d 5 (2d Cir. 1983).
419. 465 U.S. 1025 (1984).
420. 654 F.2d 843 (2d Cir. 1981).
421. 648 F.2d 88, 94-95 (2d Cir. 1981).
422. Id. at 94.
423. Id.
424. 495 F.2d 228 (2d Cir. 1974).
425. 6 F.3d 666, 670 (9th Cir. 1993).
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complaint that alleged contemporaneous trading over a three-year period when the
plaintiff could not particularize the timing of his trade.
Several lower courts also have divided on the somewhat bizarre situation
in which an in pari delicto defense is applicable in such cases. The United States
Supreme Court finally resolved that disagreement in Bateman Eichler, Hill
Richards, Inc. v. Berner,426 in which the Court stated that a plaintiff should be
barred in these circumstances only where "(1) as a direct result of his own actions,
the plaintiff bears at least substantially equal responsibility for the violations he
seeks to redress, and (2) preclusion of suit would not significantly interfere with
the effective enforcement of the securities laws and protection of the investing
public."427
The broader the period that is deemed to be "contemporaneous" the
greater the exposure of the defendant, although it is difficult to explain why a
person who traded on an impersonal stock exchange four days after the
defendant's trade should have a cause of action while one who traded one month
later does not. In neither case is the transaction lased on anything more than
chance.421 Moreover, this Joe Six-Pack "victim" could argue that had he only
known of the defendant's conduct, he would have sold or bought, or declined to do
so (based on the direction of the stock price); both hypothetical transactions.
Disturbingly, Congress seems to have left this door open as well.
3. Post § 20(A) Cases
Since adoption of § 20(A),429 courts have taken a unique approach
concerning individual shareholders claiming to be "contemporaneous trader"
plaintiffs.
In Fujisawa Pharmaceutical Co. v. Kopoor, 430 a district court held that
no claim could be asserted under § 20(A) by someone who had a direct face-to-
face transaction. Such a person needed to proceed under the operable state blue sky
law. By the phrase, "contemporaneous traders," said the court, "Congress meant
those individuals who, like the plaintiffs in Shapiro, purchased stock anonymously
on the open market.
' 431
While on its face this view seemed to limit such claims, what it did was to
eliminate only those rare situations in which one has an individual privity
relationship with the defendant. It left open claims by any "anonymous" seller,
buyer, or would-be trader, including speculative traders.
426. 472 U.S. 299 (1985).
427. Id. at 310-11.
428. William K.S. Wang, Trading on Material Nonpublic Information on
Impersonal Stock Markets: Who is Harmed, and Who Can Sue Whom Under SEC Rule 10b-
5?, 54 S. CAL. L. REV. 1217, 1274-84 (1981).
429. 15 U.S.C. § 78t-1 (1994).
430. 932 F. Supp. 208 (N.D. 1l. 1996).
431. Id. at 210.
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Fortunately, a few cases have limited this liability. In Chanoff v. U.S.
Surgical Corp.,432 a stockholder who had bought his shares more than a month
before the most recent illegal trade by the corporate officer, was not considered a
"contemporaneous" investor for purposes of stating a federal claim based on
insider trading.433 In the case of In re Verifone Securities Litigation,434 the stock
purchases by the plaintiffs occurred at least two weeks apart from the transactions
of the insider defendants. These investors were held to have failed to meet the
requirement that the trades occurred "contemporaneously."
435
In a similar decision, Alfus v. Pyramid Technology Corp.,436 the court said
that a class action could not be formed by all those who may have traded between
the time of the defendants' illegal stock sale and the corporation's remedial
disclosure of the material information, which took a period of four and a half
months. Individual proof by the specific plaintiff was needed to give standing that
one was a contemporaneous trader with the defendants.
Most recently, in Clay v. Riverwood International Corp.,4 37 a plaintiff
who bought common stock on the same day that executives of the issuer exercised
stock options previously granted them, lacked standing to sue those executives for
insider trading. The court found that there was no transactional nexus between the
executives' exercise of their privilege and the plaintiff's purchase of stock. In
short, the Securities Exchange Act prohibiting purchase or sale of securities by an
insider who has material information not known to the public only applies to
"contemporaneous" insider transactions. 438
Where the line can be drawn, however, becomes the classic argument of
the beard, and guidance is needed from Congress. Moreover, how the Reform
Act's pleading standards finally will be applied also remains an open question at
this time because of the uncertainty of Congressional language and the absence of
U.S. Supreme Court opinions.
4. Limits Are Necessary Now
It is suggested that lines should be drawn at this point, and that implied
private causes of action under § 20(A) should not be extended against individual
defendants under the misappropriation theory.
Examine for a moment the possibilities of the identity of the plaintiff in
such cases. The vast majority of all common stockholders own their shares either
through mutual funds or institutions.439 If one were to inquire of the average
investor (the so-called Joe Six-Pack) for the names of even a few of the companies
432. 857 F. Supp. 1011 (D. Conn. 1994).
433. Id. at 1021-23.
434. 784 F. Supp. 1471 (N.D. Cal. 1992), aftd, 11 F.3d 865 (9th Cir. 1993).
435. Id. at 1489.
436. 745 F. Supp. 1511 (N.D. Cal. 1990).
437. 964 F. Supp. 1559 (N.D. Ga. 1997).
438. Id. at 1568.
439. MUTUAL FuND OwNERsHn' IN THE U.S.: FUNDAMENTALS: INVESTMENT
COMPANY INSTITUTE RESEARCH IN BMRF (1996).
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which his mutual fund owns, he undoubtedly could not do so. He probably would
not even be interested. His concern is to make money for his account, and rightly
so. The best that he probably could do would be to identify the name of the
investing corporation, for example, Fidelity, Franklin, Vanguard, or Merrill
Lynch.' 4 It would be likely that many such investors would not even know the
specific fund name.
Indeed, if he were actually given the list of stocks which composed the
portfolio of his fund, it is probable that he would not even recognize the names of
most of the companies or the types of businesses in which they are engaged. Is this
wrong? Of course not. It is his right as an investor. He is only focusing on bottom-
line results-in effect, a form of legalized gambling not much different from the
Las Vegas blackjack tables. However, are these really the types of individuals
whom Congress should protect?
Taking the case even further, the other type of investor most commonly
found would be the highly sophisticated speculator."' This individual examines
information concerning companies and, in effect, places his best reasoned guess on
either their growth (when he buys), or the deterioration of their stock price (short
sales). Essentially, his interest is not in the business itself, just its stock price.
It is estimated that twelve percent of the daily volume on the NASDAQ
originates with so-called "day traders," people who buy and sell shares hundreds
of times a day on a purely speculative basis." 2 Is this a person whom Congress
should protect? Such people undoubtedly have already made some money on the
very stock in question but may have sold earlier than when the announcement of
the news occurred. Indeed, day trading operations require deposits that start at no
less than $25,000. Is Congress in the business of maximizing the profits for
speculators?
As Justices White and O'Connor stated in their dissent in Basic Inc. v.
Levinson,' "[h]ow a person who undertook such a speculative stock-investing
strategy-and made [money per] share doing so--...can say that he was
'defrauded' by virtue of his reliance on the 'integrity' of the market price is
beyond me. And such speculators may not be uncommon.... "' Essentially
integrity has nothing to do with a stock's price-that number is a function of
supply and demand.
Moreover, the concerns about extensive discovery, disruption of normal
business activity and inability to prove actual damages would be enormous.
440. THE MUTUALFUND FACT BOOK (1997); Kelleher, supra note 12.
441. Kelleher, supra note 11. In the early 1980s, the National Association of
Securities Dealers established the small-order execution system, ostensibly to give "small"
investors greater access to trading in the markets. With the advent of computer trading,
dozens of companies in the United States have been created to cater to day traders,
providing them with essential, real time market quotes and a system to execute orders
instantly.
442. Id. "What we try to teach people is that in day trading, stocks aren't stocks.
They are four-letter symbol for making money." 'My mom calls it legalized gambling." Id.
443. 485 U.S. 224,250 (1988).
444. Id. at 261-62.
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Frivolous lawsuits could be brought whenever someone could claim either that I
"would have bought or sold" if I had known all of the same information, or I
would have made even more money.
One might further ask whether it is possible that a person who is not even
a "contemporaneous trader" can be injured in some direct way by insider trading?
The House Committee Report on §20(A) suggests that it is:
In the view of the Committee, § 10(b), Rule 10b-5, and other
relevant provisions of the Exchange Act have sufficient flexibility to
recognize and protect any person defrauded or harmed by a
violation of any provision of this title or the rules or regulations
thereunder by another person's purchasing or selling a security
while in the possession of material, nonpublic information, or
communicating such information to others."45
In the view of the Committee, it was also important to note
that.. .the potential harm to the plaintiff from the defendant's insider
trading or tipping may be far greater than the profit gained or loss
avoided by that defendant. The Committee recognizes that where
the plaintiff demonstrates that he was defrauded by the defendant's
insider trading and suffered actual damages proximately caused by
the defendant's behavior, a cap of profit gained or loss avoided by
the defendant, which is applicable for actions by contemporaneous
traders, is not appropriate. Rather, in such an implied private cause
of action, the plaintiff should be able to recover the full extent of
those actual damages." 6
This legislative intent, if followed, could dramatically expand individual litigation
in this area, with its attendant speculative components of proof and damages.4'
445. The most prominent example of the non-contemporaneous trader suit which
came to the attention of the Conunittee involved a suit filed by Anheuser-Busch Companies,
Inc. against Paul Thayer, a former director of the corporation. See Anheuser-Busch
Companies, Inc., v. Thayer, CA3-85-0794-R (N.D. Tex. 1986). In that case, the plaintiff
alleged that it was defrauded not as a result of trading with the defendant, but by having
information secretly stolen and by having the subsequent trading on the information
concealed. According to the complaint in this case, prior to public dissemination, the tipper
disclosed to several parties the plans of Anheuser-Busch to acquire Campbell Taggart, Inc.
The alleged misappropriation of Anheuser-Busch's confidential information proximately
caused a significant increase in the market price of Campbell Taggart stock before
Anheuser-Busch announced its offer. This forced Anheuser-Busch to raise its tender offer
price, and the company eventually paid approximately $80 million more as a result of the
illegal insider trading. Clearly, in such a case, the plaintiff corporation was a victim of the
defendant's misappropriation. In the view of the Committee, where the plaintiff can prove
that it suffered injury as a result of the defendant's insider trading, the plaintiff has standing
to sue in this circumstance, and the remedial purposes of the securities laws require
recognition of such an action.
446. H.R. Rep. No. 100-910 at 11, 27 (1988), reprinted at 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N.
6043.
447. On the other hand, in Feldman v. Motorola, Inc., 1994 WL 722883 (N.D.
Ill.), the court reached the opposite conclusion, stating that "By limiting actions under
§ 20A,...Congress deliberately created a narrow cause of action." Id. at * 2.
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By comparison, under the Securities Act of 1933; 48 Congress did not
charge the SEC with interpreting registration statements for prospective investors.
Its only objective is to require "full and fair disclosure.""' 9 The individual buyers
have to make up their own minds. A similar philosophy should apply here.
As Justice Rehnquist lamented in Blue Chip,45 "it would be disingenuous
to suggest that either Congress in 1934 or the Securities and Exchange
Commission in 1942, foreordained the present state of the law with respect to Rule
lOb-5." What has happened since has exacerbated the problem.
Just eight years before Blue Chip"5' in the landmark Texas Gulf Sulphur52
case, Judge Friendly, in his concurring opinion, stated in relevant part:
If we were writing on a clean slate, I would have some doubt
whether the framers of the Securities Exchange Act intended § 10(b)
to provide a remedy for an evil that had long been effectively
handled by derivative actions for waste of corporate assets under
state law simply because in a particular case the waste took the form
of a sale of securities." 453
Sadly, Justice Rehnquist's oft quoted statement: 'When we deal with private
actions under Rule 10b-5, we deal with a judicial oak which has grown from little
more than a legislative acom," 4-5 has come to pass.
5. A Final Comparative Look at § 16
Ironically, Congress gave a poor answer on this question of the identity of
possible plaintiffs under its § 16(b)155 guidelines. There, the statute provides that a
suit to recover the profits can be instituted by the issuer (corporation) "or by the
owner of any security of the issuer in the name and in behalf of the issuer if the
issuer shall fail or refuse to bring such suit within 60 days after request.. .,,456
What has happened with that statute since is virtual champerty. The
plaintiff need not even own the shares at the time of the defendant's insider trading
under § 16(b). He only needs to own one share at the time the suit is filed. More
expansively, Justice Souter, writing for the court in Gollust v. Mendell,"57 stated
that the plaintiff need not even own that share at the time of trial when that share
no longer exists because another company purchased all the shares, so long as the
person owns a share in the new parent company. However, he still had to own the
original share at the time the suit was initiated.
448. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (1994).
449. Id.
450. Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723,737 (1975).
451. Id.
452. SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968).
453. Id. at 865 n.1.
454. Blue Chip Stamps, 421 U.S. at 737.
455. 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1994).
456. Id.
457. 501 U.S. 115 (1991).
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Who benefits from such cases? Certainly not the corporation, which has
either chosen not to file a derivative suit or has no particular interest in the matter.
Certainly not the plaintiff-owner of one particular share, who probably never heard
of the issuer before being told by his counsel to buy it, well after the defendant's
trades occurred.458 Moreover, it is not even necessary to actually resort to litigation
in order to earn the fee. In most cases lawyers receive a quarter to a third of the
entire recovery. This is not a class action situation where all the shareholders
benefit or one in which a fine is paid to the SEC for the benefit of society.459 Such
a tragic state of the law does nothing but further the public's already significantly
negative image of lawyers and their unnecessary litigation, and, itself, calls for
legal reform. To extend this rationale to Rule lOb-5 cases and allow speculator
plaintiffs with hypothetical transactions to sue tippees on a misappropriation
theory would make a further mockery of the system.
6. The Rationale Is Available
The Supreme Court has already stated that
If Congress had legislated the elements of a private cause of action
for damages, the duty of the judicial branch would be to administer
the law which Congress enacted; .... [blut as we have pointed out we
are not dealing here with any private right created by the express
language of § 10(b) or of Rule 10b-5. No language in either of those
provisions speaks at all to the contours of a private cause of action
for their violation.... We are dealing with a private cause of action
which has been judicially found to exist and which will have to be
judicially delimited one way or another unless and until Congress
addresses the question.4 °
The SEC will continue to bring its criminal and civil actions on the
theories already enunciated by the court. Likewise, if there is privity or some direct
relationship between the plaintiff and defendant, recovery should be allowed.461
458. In Magida v. Continental Can Co., 231 F.2d 843 (2d Cir. 1956), where
certiorari again was denied, 351 U.S. 972 (1956), the Second Circuit Court refused to allow
a defense of champerty even though the plaintiff's pro rata share of recovery amounted to
only $1.10. Plaintiffs attorney received virtually all of a large award.
459. § 21D(a)(6) of the 1934 Act, added by the Reform statute, provides: "(6)
Restriction on Payment of Attorneys' Fees and Expenses. Total attorneys' fees and
expenses awarded by the court to counsel for the plaintiff class shall not exceed a
reasonable percentage of the amount of any damages and prejudgment interest actually paid
to the class." 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(a)(6) (Supp. 1996) (emphasis added). No interpretation of
this language has yet to be made judicially.
460. See Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723,748 (1975).
461. The states have particularly stated that they do not accept the "fraud on the
market theory" in many jurisdictions. To do otherwise would simply perpetuate the
regrettable circumstances of the § 16(b) identity of the plaintiff. In Mirken v. Wasserman,
858 P.2d 568 (1993), the California Supreme Court refused to accept the "fraud on the
marketplace" theory in its state securities fraud case, and in Lindner Fund, Inc., v.
Waldbaum, Inc., 624 N.E.2d 160 (1993), the New York Court of Appeals held that the
tender offerors did not have a "duty of public disclosure upon reaching agreement in
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The misappropriation theory as defined by the court in O'Hagan62
requires a "breach of duty" to the source of the critical information. This test,
however, creates no specific duty on the part of a trading defendant to some
individual, fractional shareowner of a mutual fund held in street name. More
clearly, such defendants as tippee-traders and those who allegedly aid and abet
trades based on misappropriated information have no identifiable duty to such an
anonymous plaintiff.
The "fraud on the marketplace" theory applied by the Supreme Court to
corporate conduct also is not appropriate in such a case. Identified in Justice
Blackmun's plurality opinion in Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 3 the phrase was not used
in Central Bank'6 or any other subsequent cases and should be rejected now. The
rationale has been rejected by the California Supreme Court, the most active state
jurisdiction in the field." Blackmun's rationale stands as an isolated view in a
plurality holding; the product of an arithmetic aberation in the court's composition.
Justice Ginsburg's statement in O'Hagan that scienter is still essential to find
culpability should finally suffice to abrogate the "fraud on the marketplace"
doctrine.
Language also exists in O'Hagan to preclude such private causes of
action on a misappropriation theory against individual defendants with whom they
had no direct dealing. Quoting Chiarella, Justice Ginsburg said that § 10(b)
liability "is premised upon a duty to disclose arising from a relationship of trust
and confidence between parties to a transaction." '466 Moreover, she reminded,
"[tihere is under § 10(b), we explained, no general duty between all participants in
market transactions to forgo actions based on material nonpublic information.
Under established doctrine, we said, a duty to disclose or abstain from trading
arises from a specific relationship between two parties."'
It would seem then that support for the limitations on private causes of
action argued herein can be based upon an interpretation of the O'Hagan language:
"These statements rejected the notion that § 10(b) stretches so far as to impose a
general duty between all participants in market transactions to forgo actions based
468 e thm t tha conext 469
on material, nonpublic information,"' and we confine them to that context.
Relying at some length on the Eighth Circuit's "misreading" of Central
Bank, the majority noted that that opinion's reference to purchasers or sellers of
securities had to be viewed in terms of the Supreme Court's longstanding
restriction on private § 10(b) litigation. Citing historic rulings on this point from as
principle on the acquisition," both direct rejections of Justice Blackmun's plurality opinion
in Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224 (1988).
462. United States v. O'Hagan, 117 S. Ct. 2199 (1997).
463. 485 U.S. 224 at 241.
464. Central Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. 164
(1994).
465. See Mirkin, 858 P.2d at 571, 572.
466. O'Hagan 117 S. Ct. at 2212 (quoting Chiarella v. U.S., 445 U.S. 222, 230
(1980)).
467. Id. at 2211-12 (quoting Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 233).
468. Id. at 2212 (quoting Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 233).
469. Id.
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far back as Blue Chip Stamps, Justice Ginsburg referred to such major "policy"
considerations as "the abuse potential and proof problems inherent in suits by
investors who neither bought nor sold, but asserted they would have traded absent
fraudulent conduct by others."'47
It is submitted here that this rationale should be applied to those who,
conversely, would claim in a private civil suit that they would not have traded had
they known of the defendant's fraudulent trade based upon his misappropriation of
nondisclosed material information.
The lengthy dissent of Justices White and O'Connor in the Basic Inc. v.
Levinson47 case speaks on this point as well. That plurality decision,472 the
dissenting Justices believed, hopefully rejected the "recovery by a plaintiff who
claims merely to have been harmed by a material misrepresentation which altered
the marketprice notwithstanding proof that the plaintiff did not in any way rely on
that price."'473 One can rebut such evidence, but the burden is enormously difficult.
"[The plurality's]... 'presumption of reliance' also assumes that buyers and sellers
rely-not just on the market price-but on the 'integrity' of that price. It is this
aspect of the fraud on the market hypothesis which most mystifies me."474
This view that there is no real integrity of a market price, has been
supported by many, since "[i]ndeed many investors purchase or sell stock because
they believe the price inaccurately reflects the corporation's worth, 475 and seek to
take advantage of that point. The price of a stock is simply a function of its
demand and supply-for whatever honorable or dishonorable reasons.
To expand the category of plaintiffs means that:
Such investors, the savviest of the savvy, will be able to recover
under the Court's opinion, as long as they now claim that they
"believed in the integrity of the market price" when they sold their
stock.... I suspect that all too often the majority's rule will "lead to
large judgments, payable in the last analysis by innocent investors,
for the benefit of speculators and their lawyers." This Court and
others have previously recognized that "inexorably broadening.. .the
class of plaintiff[s] who may sue under this theory of law will
ultimately result in more harm than good., 476
470. O'Hagan, 117 S. Ct. at 2213.
471. 485 U.S. 224 (1988).
472. See Justice Powell's opinion in CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America,
481 U.S. 69 (1987), for a less than subtle sarcastic characterization of the binding effect of
plurality opinions.
473. Basic, 485 U.S. at 251.
474. Id. at 255.
475. Id. at 256. See Barbara Black, Fraud on the Market: A Criticism of
Dispensing With Reliance Requirements in Certain Open Market Transactions, 62 N.C. L.
Rv. 435, 455 (1984); Strauss & Fishbone, supra note 5, at 374; Salbu, supra note 5; see
also Hazen, supra note 5, at 597.
476. Basic, 485 U.S. at 262 (second ellipse and brackets in original) (citation
omitted).
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With the SEC and courts ready to interpret O'Hagan in broader contexts,
it is essential now to draw a line in the sand, allowing only the SEC or a party with
a direct trading relationship to sue individual defendants under the
misappropriation theory.

